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Today, more than six billion people live on earth. If human population today amounted to
only 1.6 billion, the same as at the beginning of the 20th century, many of the challenges for
a sustainable future that now confront us would be vastly different. Demographic changes are
closely intertwined in complex ways with nearly all critical questions facing humanity – be it
the climate, the environment, food security, the fight against disease, or for social security and
peace. Therefore, demographic trends are extremely significant and it is important to foster a
broader knowledge of these changes and to heighten awareness of their consequences.
Institutions like the United Nations and the Population Reference Bureau (PRB) dissemi-
nate information on world population trends and developments to a wide variety of audi-
ences, from the general public to government officials. Nonetheless, there is a demand for an
annual update of global population dynamics that is both comprehensive and non-technical.
In the past, changes in the size or age and sex structure of a population took centuries to
evolve and such changes often passed unnoticed. In contrast, the 20th century witnessed a
series of major demographic developments that unfolded at record-breaking speed. The faster
population changes occur, however, the more strongly they are felt. It is neither the growth
nor the decline in numbers alone that pose the greatest challenges for societies in which they
are occurring. It is the dynamics of demographic processes such as the unprecedented growth
or aging of a society, its rising mortality due to HIV/AIDS, or its rapid urbanization. For that
reason, this report emphasizes the dynamics of population change.
Besides the dynamics of population, it is the divergence in demographic trends that poses
additional requirements for political and social strategies aimed at coping with population
change. This issue gains importance when demographic developments in neighboring
regions vary significantly or take different paths to growth or decline. These often very pro-
nounced contrasts can paint an increasingly complex picture on a regional or national level
or even below the national level.
World Population Dynamics Report 2002 is the first attempt to present these complex issues in
an up-to-date and comprehensible format for a broad, interested readership. We are very
grateful to have Carl Haub as author of this report. We invite you to share your comments and
suggestions for future editions of the World Population Dynamics Report with us.
This report would not have been possible without the generous support of the William and
Flora Hewlett Foundation, for which we are most grateful.
Hans Fleisch
Executive Director
Berlin-Institute for World Population and Global Development
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Fig. 1: Global Population Growth, 1950–2050
A Developing Country Phenomenon
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision
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The 21st Century will feature a first-time occurrence in world history: virtually all population
growth will be in the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Population
growth will no longer be a phenomenon shared by all regions. Put quite simply, the Earth will
be very different demographically at the end of this century from what it was at the beginning.
Beyond the shift in the balance of numbers itself, many of the implications of this new
world are unknown. There will, of course, be significant increases in the demand for food,
water, and energy in developing countries. Some of that increase will be due to growth in
numbers and some will result from rising living standards. Indeed, there will likely be a
tradeoff between the two. Much of the increase in resource demand will result from rising liv-
ing standards, but that, in turn, will likely depend upon slowing population growth. It is
argued that rapid population growth impedes development, particularly when it occurs in
countries with few cash resources to cope with both population growth and the need to
expand the delivery of health, education, and social services.
A key difference between demographic trends in this new century and the past century is
the growing divergence not only between regions, but even within them. In the Middle East,
where fertility was once uniformly high, there have been spectacular declines in birth rates in
some countries, but none in others. Women in Iran, Tunisia, and Turkey now average less
than three children each, while their counterparts in Saudi Arabia and Yemen maintain high
levels of fertility of about six to seven children each. Although rural populations still grow in
Africa, cities such as Lagos, Nigeria, which held but 288,000 residents in 1950, is projected by
the UN to be about 13 million today. Monitoring trends such as these will be key to under-
standing population trends today and in the future.
Author’s Preface
Only a few single phenomena are capable of “changing the world.” Among those, we can eas-
ily count major political upheavals, environmental change, and the sheer growth in the num-
ber of earth’s inhabitants. And, such monumental changes are often inevitably intertwined.
The World Population Dynamics Report is concerned with one of these fundamental factors:
population change. It is a matter of numbers since increases in numbers can have profound
effects. But population is more broadly defined. It is not just how many we are. How long do
we live? How many youth in a population? How many elderly? Where do we live? Do we
move from place to place? Do countries have policies to change population growth?
The century just past has seen more changes, it has been said, than any other in human his-
tory. Certainly, our knowledge of the world around us has multiplied a hundred, a thousand
times. Events in distant countries can become common knowledge in a matter of minutes.
Travel has become not a once in a lifetime experience, but a routine event, at least for some of
us. Migrants from India now travel to North America, Africans to Europe, human movements
unknown in our grandparents’ time. Markets have expanded to the point where “globaliza-
tion” has now become a cause celèbre.
These changes would be significant in their own right, but they have become magnified in
the light of global population growth. The expansion in numbers has not, however, been
equally distributed. It is not the traditional “world powers” that have seen their numbers
swell. To the extent that numbers result in a shift of influence, that shift has been and will
continue to be towards the populations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. That is neither a
good nor a bad thing. But it is reality. 
Today, we are given an opportunity to understand the changes around us as communica-
tions rapidly increases. The World Population Dynamics Report will monitor those changes each
year, describing the significant demographic events of the year and detailing where we stand.
The report will do that by gathering information from a wide variety of sources, painting a
complete portrait of the population of the planet and its development through births, deaths
and the movement of peoples.
Carl Haub
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Figure 1 dramatically illustrates the vast difference in population growth between developed
and developing countries, as they are today defined1). How did this situation come about?
The answer lies in the very different way in which the “demographic transition” took place in
the developed and developing countries.
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1 In the commonly-used United Nations definition, the “developing” countries are those in Africa, Asia, Latin
America, and Oceania. Latin America includes Mexico and the Caribbean. The “developed” countries are
those of Europe (including all of Russia) and North America, along with Australia, Japan, and New Zealand.
The theory of the demographic transition is quite simple. It merely states that countries
begin with high birth and death rates and, during the course of modernization, proceed
to low birth and death rates. Although the timing of that process can vary considerably
from country to country, the overall pattern has been observed time and time again.
In the preindustrial era, all countries began with high birth rates. Little or no contra-
ception was practiced and larger numbers of births were valued since they were needed
for the family farm. Both infant and adult mortality were quite high from the lack of any
type of modern health care as well as from poor methods of public health and sanita-
tion. Death rates also fluctuated wildly as local crop failures brought starvation and epi-
demics struck without warning.
Then, as society urbanized and modernized, the need for large families began to
wane. At the same time, simple public health measures and better food distribution
Fig. 2: Sweden’s 250 Year Demographic Transition, 1750–2000
Source: Statistics Sweden, www.scb.se
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Fig. 4: Life Expactancy at Birth in the United States and Mexico, 1900–1995
Sources: United States: official data from the National Center for Health Statistics and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Mexico: official estimates after 1930, historical estimates 1900–1930
Since 1950, the effect of rapidly declining mortality in developing countries, accompanied by
much slower declines in birth rates, has changed the world to the point where developed
countries, about one-third of global population in 1950, now account for one-fifth. Nearly 90
percent of world population growth since 1950 has been in the developing countries. The
century just past holds a singular place in world history. In that 100 years alone, nearly three
times as much population growth as had occurred in all of human history took place – and
80 percent of that growth took place in the last 50 years. Today, about 99 percent of popula-
tion growth takes place in the developing countries.
The rapid pace of modern population growth is clearly shown by the “benchmark years,”
the years in which each billion was reached.
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raised living standards and death rates began a long period of slow decline. Finally, dur-
ing this centuries-long process, the rate of population was never very high, no more than
1.0 to 1.5 percent per year. Sweden’s demographic history over the past 250 years illus-
trates this quite well.
Most developing countries remained in a nearly preindustrial condition well into the
20th Century. When the transition began, it was very different from the developed coun-
tries in that it happened much more quickly, particularly after World War II. Death rates
fell sharply as methods of modern medicine and public health campaigns, well estab-
lished in Europe and North America, spread abruptly. But, in most cases, societies
remained largely agrarian and the traditional desire for large families did not change. As
a result, the rate of population growth rose to heights never before seen, to nearly three
percent or more, as the example of Sri Lanka clearly illustrates. 
The graph (Fig. 4) comparing life expectancy trends in the United States and Mexico
provides a dramatic comparison – by the end of the 20th Century, Mexico has nearly
reached parity, closing the deficit of about 20 years around 1900.
Since about 1970, the birth rate has now declined in many developing countries,
marking the second part of their transition. But, the future of global population depends
upon how quickly – or how slowly – fertility in developing countries declines to levels
comparable to those in developed countries.
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Population Dynamics
Country populations grow (or decline) largely in one way: by the difference between
births and deaths. Migration in and out can also have an effect, but, in many countries,
that effect is relatively small. The number of births is a result of childbearing preferences
in the country, i.e., the number of children a woman bears in her lifetime, whether or not
that pregnancy was wanted. The number of deaths results from two chief factors: the age
structure of the population – the proportion in the older ages – and the overall level of
mortality from disease and other causes. 
Age structure is one of the more aspects in demography in that the number of deaths
that occur is normally dependent on the number of elderly in the population and the
number of future births depends on the number of young people below age 15 today. An
“old“ population, one with relatively few people below age 15, will have relatively few
births in the future compared to a population with large proportions below 15 (35 to 50
percent). These three factors, births, deaths, and migration, combine with age structure
to produce population change. 
Vital Rates
The level of the birth rate, or fertility, is most often expressed as a country’s total fertility
rate (TFR) , or the average number of children a woman can be expected to have in her
lifetime at the pace of childbearing of a particular year. The TFR today varies from as low
as only 1.1 children per woman (in some countries of Asia and Europe) to over seven
children (particularly in Africa), the widest range in history. The level of the death rate, or
mortality, is conveniently summarized by life expectancy at birth, or the average number
of years a newborn baby can be expected to live. That normally rises during the child’s
lifetime as progress against various diseases is made. Sadly, it can also decrease, as has
happened in countries severely affected by AIDS.
Ultimately, fertility, mortality, and migration combine their effects to produce popula-
tion change:
P(2) = P(1) + Births – Deaths + Immigrants – Emigrants
Table 2: Number of Years It Took to Add Each Billion to World Population
Year reached Years to add each billion
First Billion about 1800 all of human history
Second Billion 1930 130
Third Billion 1960 30
Fourth Billion 1974 14
Fifth Billion 1987 13
Sixth Billion 1999 12
Table 1: World Population 1900, 1950, and 2000 (millions)
Source: 1900, author’s estimates. 1950 and 2000, United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: 
The 2000 Revision.
Percent of Total Percent of Total
World Growth World Growth
1900 1950 1900 – 1950 2000 1950 – 2000
World 1,650 2,519 100 6,057 100
Developed Countries 543 814 31 1,191 11
Developing Countries 1,107 1,706 69 4,865 89
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Age Structure
Today, country populations have more variation in age structure than ever before. In
Africa, many countries have as much as 45 percent of their population below the age of
15, a result of high birth rates and very small proportions in the older ages. In developed
countries, relatively few are below age 15, only 15 percent in the case of Italy, but one in
four or higher are above the age of 60. 
The cause of the unprecedented post-1950 population growth is evident in Figure 7, which
clearly shows the result of rapidly rising life expectancy combined with high birth rates in
developing countries. Population growth rates in developing countries rose to a rate during
the 1960s that had never been seen previously. This rapid growth in population was of par-
ticular concern since it was taking place in the world’s poorest nations. Concern over its
effects mobilized some developing countries to take action. This required the establishment
of population policies and family planning programs – often in societies where limiting the
number of one’s children was a new and not necessarily acceptable idea.
But many of these programs did have success as Figure 8 shows. Fertility fell – at a faster
pace than it had ever done in developed countries – helped by the slowly spreading supply of
modern contraceptive services. This is the “second transformation“ of the developing world,
12 World Population Dynamics 2002
Or, the population at the end of the period, P(2), is the result of the population at the
beginning of the period, P(1), plus the number of people entering, minus the ones leav-
ing the country.
Fig. 5: Population of the Developing Countries in 2000: One-Third Below Age 15
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision
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a movement away from large families even without significant economic and social develop-
ment.
As dramatic as the decline in fertility has been, population growth is far from over. Still,
some writers today say that the world’s chief demographic problem is low, not high, birth
rates. Is this true? It is true that birth rates throughout Europe are at extremely low levels, but
the same does not hold for developing countries. The prospect of “zero population growth“
remains elusive.
Prospects for the 21st Century
Today, we know that fertility rates are in decline in many developing countries and that their
future population size will greatly depend on how quickly it falls in the next few decades.
While birth rates have been historically difficult to predict, the projections of the United
Nations Population Division give an excellent picture of future population trends under dif-
ferent possible scenarios.
Population projections are performed by beginning with a current population by sex and
age and applying assumptions about the future path of the birth and death rate (fertility and
mortality), as well as the effects of migration, if appropriate. A significant point in fertility is
reached at the replacement level, when women average about two children each. If fertility
were to remain at that level, population size would someday become stationary. Actual
replacement level is about 2.1 children in countries with high life expectancy since there are
about five percent more boy babies born than girl babies and not all women survive through
their childbearing years. Is replacement level the future for developing countries? Will couples
in those countries have somewhat more than two children? Or will they follow the “Euro-
pean pattern“ and have far fewer than two children? Since these questions cannot today be
answered, the UN offers projections for all three of those possibilities.
The medium projection of the UN offers a projection of global population should the
world birth rate in 2050 be very close to the replacement level of about two children per
woman. In doing so, the UN is not predicting that two children will be the average. A bench-
mark scenario is simply provided to which other projections can be compared. Should the
average be about two children (2.2 in developing countries, 1.9 in developed countries),
world population would rise from today’s 6.1 billion to 9.3 billion by mid-Century. This
medium projection represents a 50 percent increase of the current world population, all of
which will be in the developing countries. 
The high projection assumes that the TFR will be one half child higher, about 2.6 (2.7 in
developing countries, 2.3 in developed countries). Should that occur, world population
would rise to almost 11 billion by 2050 and be growing by about one percent per year, not
much less the 1.3 percent global growth rate of today.
Finally, the low projection assumes that fertility will be well below replacement level in
2050 at a birth rate of only 1.6 (1.7 in developing countries, 1.5 in developed countries). In
that case, world population will rise to just under eight billion and will have just begun a very
slow decline by 2050.
As far as mortality is concerned, it is generally assumed that life expectancy at birth will
slowly rise worldwide as health conditions improve and infant mortality, in particular,
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Fig. 8:  Total Fertility Rates, 1950–2000: 
A Gradually Narrowing Difference
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision 
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For many years, the demography of Africa has been unique for two reasons: its very high fer-
tility and very young age structure. That situation remains true today and is the reason that no
other world region has as much potential for population growth. While those remain as
demographic characteristics that set Africa apart, a third has now been added: AIDS. AIDS has
drastically altered the outlook for some African countries, but the continent will nonetheless
experience tremendous population growth even with the AIDS catastrophe.
The unusually young age structure of Africa itself assures long-term population growth on the
continent. The United Nations projection for Africa anticipate an addition of 1.2 billion pop-
ulation by 2050 alone. That addition is the same as the entire population of today’s devel-
oped countries. This projection includes the effect of higher AIDS mortality than previously
thought. In many African countries, the number of tomorrow’s parents (those below age 15)
accounts for nearly half of the population. In Europe, only 15 percent of the population is
below age 18. Thus, the process of slowing population growth — a stated goal of nearly every
African government – must result from two processes: fertility decline which, in turn, gradu-
ally reduces the proportion of young people in the population. 
The United Nations projections of population growth in Africa for the first half of this cen-
tury and the conclusion of each projection variant is the same: rapid population expansion.
The most commonly used projection, the medium series, results from the assumption that
African women will average about 2.4 children by mid-century – equivalent to less than half
17World Population Dynamics 2002
Africa
Fig. 1: Africa’s Population in 2000: 43 Percent Below Age 15
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision
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declines. Today, however, the rise of HIV/AIDS, especially in Africa, has changed that outlook
in some countries.
How should one interpret the UN’s projections? It is quite likely that none of the variants
will result exactly at the global level, given the divergence in trends today and the very large
difference in future population size that relatively small differences in the average number of
children make. Africa, with its high current fertility, serves as an excellent example. In the
most recent UN long-range projections (performed in 1998), Africa’s population rises to a
nearly stationary 2.3 billion by 2150 if women were to average 2.1 children. If, on the other
hand, African couples were to show a preference for somewhat larger families in the long
term, just one half child more, it would rise to 5.9 billion! Rather than judge world popula-
tion prospects at the global level, one should consider the prospects for fertility decline at the
regional level. One region might follow the path to the two-child family or less, while anoth-
er’s show a very different trend. In the following sections, the outlook for divergent trends can
be considered.
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of today’s fertility level. This medium projection recognizes that current fertility in Africa is
quite high and contraceptive use rather low. Under this scenario, population growth in Africa
will continue well into the 22nd Century, passing two billion before growth stops. The only
way that African population growth will slow significantly in this century would be if fertility
were to fall to less than two children by 2050, about that of France. Is such a fertility transfor-
mation possible? While many observers would doubt it, demography has often been full of
surprises.
The first essential condition for slower population growth, birth rate decline, has barely
begun in many counties of Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In large part, societies
in sub-Saharan Africa are to this day considered “pretransitional.” What are the prospects for
fertility decline in Africa?
This was the subject of a United Nations Population Division conference in July of 2001, a
conference motivated by the recognition that it may no longer be appropriate to project every
population in sub-Saharan Africa by assuming that fertility decline will begin immediately or
necessarily follow patterns observed elsewhere. Each region and country has its own back-
drop of societal and family traditions, government policies and services, and economic devel-
opment that encourages or discourages childbearing.
In Africa, fertility decline will have to take place in societies that are primarily patriarchal,
place great value on perpetuating lineage, are often polygynous, and have strong kinship net-
works. When will African fertility begin a meaningful decline? Has it already? 
The graph shows rather dramatically that there are two very different “worlds” of fertility in
Africa. North of the Sahara, population growth has been treated as a serious national concern,
particularly in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. South of the Sahara, the picture is very different.
The curve for sub-Saharan Africa shows some decline, but that decrease has been led by only
a few countries, notably, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. 
Fortunately, an increasing number of fertility surveys shed light on a subject that would be
very difficult to answer without them. In Table 2, changes in fertility levels in Africa are shown
for countries having at least two Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). For the most part,
the story is one of high birth rates and slow decline. 
In only a few countries have African women adopted family planning in a significant way.
Kenya, one of the few countries to achieve some substantial fertility decline, still has a TFR of
nearly five children despite formulating a national population policy to slow growth as early
as 1963. The country was watched by demographers anticipating fertility decline, but that did
not begin until almost thirty years later. Uganda, whose TFR declined from about 7.4 in 1988
to 6.9 in 1995, would take over one hundred years to reach the “two-child” family.
One of the most significant outcomes of DHS surveys in Africa is that population projec-
tions for the continent are being rethought. Previously, it was assumed that fertility decline in
Africa would begin quite soon where it has not yet been seen or would accelerate as the pop-
ularity of family planning spread. Demographers are now reevaluating that assumption and
that, in fact, is why the 2000 UN conference on high fertility countries was convened.
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It does appear that Africa has, in fact, begun the transition to lower fertility, although the
number of countries is limited. What factors favor fertility decline and which might block it?
In many African cultures, a large number of children is highly prized as it ensures the lineage
of the family and provides considerable prestige. Avoiding a birth may be seen as denying an
ancestor a path to return. Extended kinship in these very rural societies means that the eco-
nomic cost of a child to a couple is often not a consideration. Finally, decisions are rarely
made as a couple in societies that are often male-dominated (and where women in general
want to have less children than men).
Still, nearly all African governments have now reversed their previous view that high fertil-
ity is desirable and have identified it as a serious impediment to raising health and living
standards. But, the time lag between such policies and results is often a long one, particularly
when the economic resources needed to establish family planning education programs – and
to change attitudes – are lacking and frequent political disruption intervenes. The establish-
ment of family planning programs will also require considerable expense for “supply,” meth-
ods such as the pill or condom. These methods require an understanding on the woman’s or
man’s part of their use, a regular supply, and the continued will to use them. 
Table 3: Fertility Trends in Africa
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys (ORC Macro, www.macroint.com)
TFR TFR Average Years 
15 – 49 15 – 49 Annual Change between
(in %) Surveys
Burkina Faso 1992 6.5 1999 6.4 –0.2 7
Cameroon 1991 5.8 1998 4.8 –2.7 7
Côte d’Ivoire 1994 5.3 1999 5.2 –0.4 5
Egypt 1995 3.6 2000 3.5 –0.4 5
Ghana 1988 6.4 1998 4.4 –3.7 10
Guinea 1992 5.7 1999 5.5 –0.5 7
Kenya 1989 6.7 1998 4.7 –3.9 9
Madagascar 1992 6.1 1997 6.0 –0.3 5
Malawi 1992 6.7 2000 6.6 –0.2 8
Mali 1987 7.1 1996 6.7 –0.6 9
Niger 1992 7.0 1998 7.2 0.5 6
Rwanda 1992 6.2 2000 5.8 –0.8 8
Senegal 1986 6.4 1997 5.7 –1.1 11
Tanzania 1992 6.2 1996 5.8 –1.7 4
Togo 1988 6.4 1998 5.2 –2.1 10
Uganda 1988 7.4 1995 6.9 –1.0 7
Zambia 1992 6.5 1996 6.1 –1.6 4
Zimbabwe 1988 5.4 1994 4.3 –3.8 6
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Fig. 4: Estimated Contraceptive Use in Africa, 1990s
Source: Population Reference Bureau, 2001 World Population Data Sheet
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One of the most sensitive indicators of development is the progress made in education, given
that even primary education provides the means for changing attitudes – particularly attitudes
on the roles of men and women in society. Primary education provides literacy, an essential
first step. According to UNESCO estimates, primary school enrollment rates rose consider-
ably since 1970, although the increase slowed in the 1990s. Only South Asia shows a similar
gap between enrollment of boys and girls as does Africa. Progress in secondary school enroll-
ment is the lowest among the world’s region, although the gap between boys and girls is less
than in some other regions. 
While population policies aiming at lowering the total fertility rate is not the primary reason for
educating girls, the effect of rising education on women’s empowerment and their decisions on
childbearing is a frequently analyzed relationship. In the graph, the relationship between edu-
cation and fertility is clear and it is one that is repeated in country after country. What is often
not made clear is that the number of women with any education above primary in developing
countries may be quite low. Women with secondary and higher education are often very differ-
ent from the majority, perhaps residing in urban areas and with parents who are committed to
educating daughters along with sons. Higher education and lower fertility therefore cannot be
seen as a simple law of cause and effect but are rather elements of a generally higher socio-eco-
nomic status. For the vast majority of the population, the cost of education is a serious obstacle
and, oftentimes, sons will come first. Here, as always, statistics tell only part of the story. The
social and cultural background of a country must always be considered as well.
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The use of family planning in the African regions with the largest populations remains low. In
sub-Saharan Africa, the only region with extensive use of contraception is Southern Africa,
but that region’s population is dominated by one country, South Africa. Elsewhere in in sub-
Saharan Africa, family planning usage is infrequent and occurs primarily in urban areas. 
What are the prospects for the spread of family planning in Africa? It is certainly true that a
small number of countries have demonstrated that the acceptance of the idea of family limi-
tation has begun, but there are many obstacles in addition to traditional attitudes towards the
number of children and a woman’s role in life. In many cases, government resolve will have
to be strengthened and the difficult process of setting up a system of counseling and supply
will have to be greatly expanded. In many cases, the funds for such programs may be lacking.
Throughout Africa, women prefer temporary, or “spacing” methods such as the pill, injection,
and intrauterine device (IUD). These methods require not only a regular and accessible
source of supply but a commitment on the part of the couple to use them. However, the belat-
ed recognition of HIV/AIDS as a national calamity by many governments may accelerate fam-
ily planning programs in ways that were not anticipated, increasing condom use and involv-
ing men to a much greater degree. 
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Informal education may play a greater role in women’s ability to exercise control over their
childbearing and have a far more immediate effect than formal schooling. Projects in Africa
to encourage male involvement and couple’s discussion of family planning have shown great
promise. The graph (Fig. 8) illustrates the general tendency for family planning usage to rise
the more couples discuss the often taboo subject. 
One key indicator of development is urbanization, the rising part of a population living
towns and cities. In Africa, this process differs from other regions in that both rural and urban
populations are growing. In fact, Africa is the only region projected to have significant growth
in the rural areas between now and 2030. The possible effects of “urbanization” must also be
considered in the light of just what “urban” actually means in any country. It is tempting to
visualize mega-cities such as Lagos or Mumbai (Bombay) when discussing urban populations
but the reality is that the vast majority of the world’s urban population lives in far smaller
cities and market towns which may themselves have only a semi-urban nature. The move to
urban areas does not necessarily signal an end to traditional lifestyles and values.
In many countries of the world, the urban population may be thought of as “non-agricultur-
al” rather than one which resides in large urban agglomerations. For example, in Ethiopia, the
population residing in localities of 2,000 or more is considered urban. This is a typical defi-
nition worldwide. In Africa, nearly 60 percent of the urban population live in places of less
than 500,000 population, but the average place is far smaller. 
Still, urban and rural residence often results in dramatic differences in fertility. Higher lev-
els of education, more frequent media exposure, the cost of living, and easier access to family
planning and health services clearly result in lower fertility in larger towns and cities. But,
even here, the true character of urban population must be kept in mind when considering the
possible future effects of urbanization on fertility levels. In Ethiopia, for example, the drop in
fertility from a TFR of 6.4 children in the rural areas to 3.3 in urban zones is quite dramatic.
But, Ethiopia’s only large urban area is the capital, Addis Ababa, with about 2.6 million pop-
ulation. After that, city sizes drop to about 100,000 and less. In Rwanda, the urban/rural dif-
ference is much less, but even the capital, Kigali, has a population of only about 250,000.
These realizations make it clear that fertility reduction in Africa will have to be accomplished
primarily in rural zones.
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Fig. 8: Couples Who Have Never Discussed Family Planning and Current Use of Familiy Planning
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys
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How predictable are fertility declines? In Africa, several countries have experienced significant
fertility decline after many years of population policy efforts. It has been observed that fertili-
ty decline in developing countries often begins with a sharp reduction as family planning is
embraced by segments of society pre-disposed to plan their number of children, such as those
in urban areas, with higher levels of education, and for whom large numbers of children are
more of an economic burden. But, as time passes, fertility decline may stall. Reaching the
“two child family” usually means that family planning must be practiced by all strata of soci-
ety, a task that may be far more difficult. In Egypt, a country with a well-organized program of
reproductive health services, substantial fertility decline took place throughout the 1980s, but
has now come to an apparent end. In Tunisia, however, there has been no such “plateau lev-
el” and the TFR declined continuously so that it now approaches the replacement level. 
Life expectancy at birth in Africa has historically been the world’s lowest. At 54 years, it is
on a par with Europe and North America around 1900. In 1950, it was a very low 35 years but
rose to about 54 at present, due in part to decreases in infant mortality. Tragically, the slow
progress made has now been halted throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa as a result of
HIV/AIDS. The situation is such that, overall, life expectancy is projected to decrease in sub-
Saharan Africa for the next 10 – 15 years. In the graph, the effect of AIDS in Botswana is quite
evident, as that country’s life expectancy is projected to fall from about 50 in 1996 to below
thirty years about 2016. Egypt, virtually unaffected by AIDS, is projected to increase steadily,
approaching 80 years by mid-Century.
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Fig. 11: Rural and Urban Total Fertility Rates in Africa, end-1990
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys Note: The figures in brackets are the proportion 
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Age
Fig. 14: Population of Botswana in 2000: A Normal Pattern by Age
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base
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Fig. 15: Population of Botswana in 2025: Portait of a Nation Ravaged by AIDS
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base
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Fig. 16: Botswana 2010 Death Rates – No Aids Mortality
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base
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Fig. 17: Botswana 2010 Death Rates – with Aids Mortality
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base
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Asia
Asia is simply earth’s population giant. The population pyramid in the accompanying graph
of Asia’s 3.7 billion shows a population that is not only great in size but one that remains
quite “young” with 30 per cent of the population below the age of 15. Still, the population of
Asia now features one aspect that Africa does not – a clear reduction in the size of the youngest
age groups compared to those above. Both age groups below the age of 10 are now estimated
to be smaller than ages 10-14, the first sign in age structure of a population for which an even-
tual end to population growth is in sight. It should be emphasized that all statistics in Asia are
heavily influenced by its two largest countries, China and India, with two-thirds of the conti-
nent’s population. Minor changes in the development of their fertility levels therefore have
major effects on the future population growth in Asia. 
Numerically, Asia will likely add about 1.5 billion population by mid-Century. Overall,
Asia’s total growth will largely result from future trends in South Asia, in which India alone
counted just over one billion residents in its census of March 2001. South Asia’s addition to
the global total should be about one billion, but that figure is very uncertain and will be
dependent upon the future course of the birth rate in India’s most populous states.
In the early 1950s, the total fertility rate in Asia was typically high for developing countries,
at about six children per woman. China’s stringent population policy in the late 1970s that
forced as many couples as possible to have only one child has now reduced the TFR in China
to about 1.8 children. But elsewhere in the region, fertility varies very widely both in its level
and trend. 
Fig. 1: Asia’s Population in 2000: Signs of a Declining Birth Rate
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision
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Age-sex pyramids of Botswana in 2000 and 2025 give a unmistakable picture of the devasta-
tion that AIDS is bringing to that country where an astoundingly high 36 percent of adults are
believed to be infected. By 2025, the population ages 40 and over will be virtually wiped out,
comprising only about 15 percent of the national total.
The first graph (Fig. 16) of death rates by age normally begins with a comparatively high
death rate in the youngest ages due to infant and child mortality, followed by a very low rate
throughout middle age, rising at the older ages. For that reason, it is often referred to as the “J-
curve.” The first graph shows a projection of Botswana’s death rates in 2010 without any AIDS
mortality. The second graph  (Fig. 17) illustrates the disease devastating effect. The distortion
to Botswana curve with death rates in the 30s and 40s nearly as high as in the 70s and 80s is
appalling. This is thought never to have happened in world history and speaks volumes about
the calamity of AIDS.
The extent of the AIDS problem in Africa is readily apparent when we consider that the
continent, home to 13 percent of the world’s population, has 70 percent of the global total
AIDS cases. Rising AIDS prevalence has also become a concern in South Asia and Eastern
Europe, but, in several countries of Africa, the damage has been done. The following countries
suffer from about 20 percent or more of their populations infected: Botswana, Lesotho, South
Africa, Namibia, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Zambia. Until recently, only a handful of coun-
tries have waged successful anti-AIDS campaigns, particularly Ghana and Uganda, but the
problem has largely been ignored by country leaders elsewhere. During 2000, however, many
heads of state began to admit that there was a problem, raising hope that progress may final-
ly be made. 
Average number of children per woman
Fig. 4: Total Fertility Rate Decline in Bangladesh, India and Thailand
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision;
Registrar General of India; Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey 1999–2000
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The wide variation in fertility in Asia is exemplified by the dramatic difference in trends
among countries, illustrated here by Bangladesh, India, and Thailand. In Thailand, fertility
decreased quickly to below the replacement level, largely due to a well-organized and inno-
vative family planning program and a receptive population. India has the longest-running
national policy to reduce population growth, initiated in 1952. But, in highly rural India, fer-
tility decline came only slowly. In the late 1970s, infamous sterilization campaigns greatly
reduced public acceptance of family planning and fertility decline stalled. Today, a more grad-
ual decrease has begun, but the future is very much in doubt. Finally, in Bangladesh, fertility
declined very slowly until the late 1980s, when it dropped rather sharply to a total fertility
rate of about 3.5. Subsequent fertility surveys have shown that total fertility rate decline has
now ceased entirely. 
Contraceptive use in Asia has changed dramatically in the past twenty years, but shows the
same large regional differences as fertility. East Asia, dominated by China, has the highest rate,
followed by Southeast Asia. Moving to the west, however, family planning usage drops off dra-
matically. The significance of this difference can be appreciated when we realize that both
South and East Asia today have the same population size, 1.5 billion, but South Asia is project-
ed to add a billion by 2050, while East Asia’s population will be approximately the same size.
India serves as an excellent example of the need to consider fertility trends below the
national level since national-level rates may obscure significant in-country variation. In the
graph, Uttar Pradesh, with its 166 million population, has clearly lagged well behind states
such as Kerala with a much smaller 32 million population. In fact, at the pace of TFR decline
in the 1990s, Uttar Pradesh would not reach a two child family until about 2038. The most
recent UN medium projections, however, assume that India’s national average TFR will reach
2.1 by 2015-2020. Clearly, fertility decline in India’s larger states must accelerate for there be
33World Population Dynamics 2002
Fig. 3: Total Fertility Rates in Asia, 1950–2000
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision
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Fig. 2: Asia: Four Billion in Growth by 2050: Half of That in South Asia 
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision
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any possibility of the medium projection being realized. If that does not happen, the popula-
tion of these larger states will grow well out of proportion to the other states, slowing the rate
of fertility decline at the national average level. This will have an enormous impact on the
population size of the country. Perhaps the magnitude of the task can be better appreciated
when we realize that the rural population of Uttar Pradesh alone is 132 million, larger than
that of Japan. Currently, the TFR in rural Uttar Pradesh is about five children per woman, a
full child higher than in urban areas.
Since 1970, education in Asia has seen gradual progress, but has lagged behind other develop-
ing country regions in the education of girls. This is particularly the case in South Asia, where
about 54 percent of boys were estimated to have been enrolled in secondary school in 1997,
compared to 36 percent of girls. In India, very large regional disparities are evident in male and
female literacy rates in the northern „Hindi Belt“ states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh and in
Rajasthan. Not coincidentally, these states have some of the country’s highest fertility rates.
No country today has as much potential population growth as does India. Some perspec-
tive on India’s size can be appreciated when we consider that the 0-4 male age group alone
totals 60 million, slightly larger than the population of France and would qualify as the 20th
largest country in the world by themselves. Each year, India adds about 17 million people,
somewhat larger than that of the Netherlands. For that reason alone, India deserves special
attention among the countries of Asia.
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Fig. 7: Basic Education in Asia: A Wide Female Gap Remains
Source: UNESCO 1999 Statistical Yearbook
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Fig. 5: Contraceptive Use in Asia, 1990s
Source: Population Reference Bureau, 2001 World Population Data Sheet
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Fig. 6: Total Fertility Rates in Selected States of India, 1971–1999: A Pattern of Wide Divergence
Source: Registrar General of India
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An additional appreciation of India’s size can be obtained by ranking the states of India as if
they were countries. Uttar Pradesh, in India’s North, would be the world’s sixth largest coun-
try at 166 million, larger than Pakistan and quite close behind Brazil. By 2025, Uttar Pradesh
will likely be the world’s fourth largest country, just behind the United States. No fewer than
five of India’s states would rank in the top twenty five of the world’s nations.
The divergence of fertility rates in India is of key importance to the country’s population
future. The southern State of Kerala is well-known for having achieved replacement level fer-
tility in the mid-1980s. But Kerala has long had a very literate population (94 percent of
males and 88 percent of females are literate). Still, Kerala accounts for only three percent of
the country’s population. The Northern State of Uttar Pradesh is an example of a very popu-
lous State with low female literacy (only 44 percent) and a slower decline in TFR. Should the
TFR decline in Uttar Pradesh show no sign of a more rapid decline in fertility, its population
will grow more rapidly than projected and hold an ever-increasing share of the national total.
The lag in fertility decline in Uttar Pradesh is even more evident when we compare it to neigh-
boring Haryana which began at the same high level in 1971, but has now declined to 3.5 chil-
dren per woman – about a full child less than in Uttar Pradesh (Fig. 11).
A particular concern in India and other Asian countries, such a China and South Korea, is
the effect of the strong preference for sons on the number of boy vs. girl babies born. Gender
imbalance has always been a concern in India, but methods of sex determination have now
spread in the country, particularly in areas where incomes have risen. The most serious situa-
tion is in the Punjab, where the 2001 Census showed an alarming 126 boys below age six to
100 girls (Fig. 12). In August of 2001, the Punjab State Chief Minister spoke out saying that
steps would be taken to prevent the aborting of female fetuses. But many practices, such as the
illegal traditional dowry are difficult to prosecute. In fact, advertising signs in Punjab compare
the low cost of abortion to the high cost of dowry!
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Fig. 10:  Population of India by State Compared to World Countries, 2001
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Fig. 8: The Gender Gap in India: Percent Literate, 2001
Source: 2001 Census of India
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Fig. 9: Population of India, 1951–2001
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Reasons for Educating Boys and Girls in Madhya Pradesh, India
In India, the reasons for not valuing the birth of a girl baby are not imagined, but real. A
girl baby will usually only grow up to leave the family house (often at an early age) and
will cost the family in terms of dowry as well. A son can often be counted upon for life-
time financial support:
“They all said they wanted to educate both their daughters and their sons. But the rea-
sons...were different. They wanted to educate their daughters so that ‘she will get some
intelligence’ and many mothers said that ‘we do not want them to suffer as we did, she
can at least write a letter when she is mistreated in her (in-law’s) house.’ For questions on
their reason for educating a son, the standard answer given by most women was that ‘if
he is educated, he might get some job,’ with an implication that this would provide them
with security in their old age.”
– from Manju Senpaty, Gender Implications of Economic Reforms in the Education Sector in
India: The Case of Haryana and Madhya Pradesh (1997)
Asia has been undergoing a swift transformation from an almost completely rural population
to one much more concentrated in towns and cities. United Nations projections suggest that
this process will accelerate in the next thirty years until Asia is half urban by 2025. The transi-
Fig. 13: Asia: 37 Percent Urban in 2000, 53 Percent Urban in 2030
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2000 Revision
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Fig. 11: Total Fertility Rate in Three States of India, 1971–1999
Source: Registrar General of India
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Fig. 12: Male Children Ages 0–6 Years per 1,000 Female Children Selected States of India, 1991 and 2001
Source: 2001 Census of India
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While Latin America’s population pyramid is still quite young, the region is on the verge of
reaching the transition to population stabilization. The region remains a mix, however, and
there are real questions as to just what the preference for children might be. Latin America’s
pyramid is heavily influenced by Brazil, which today accounts for about one-third of the
region’s population. In Brazil, women now average about 2.4 children per woman. This has
resulted in the percentage of Brazil’s population below the age of 15 declining to about 30
percent today, but higher fertility in other countries may change Latin America’s outlook.
What are Latin America’s population prospects? Surprisingly, the region’s population
future is very much in doubt, despite rather low fertility in some major countries, such as
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. United Nations projections offer a wide range of possibilities
and the answer lies in a delicate balance. If couples in Latin America have about two children,
the population would rise from about 525 million today to over 800 million in 2050, but if
their family size is somewhat higher, 2.6 children, a population of one billion with continued
growth is also possible.
Fertility decline in Latin America began rather late, but began to accelerate during the
1970s. The total fertility rate decreased to about three to four children by the 1990s, but
decline began to slow at that point. Demographers sometimes refer to this as the “Latin
American pattern,” a decrease from high fertility levels of five to seven children per woman
downwards, but not to two children, the level needed for eventual population stabilization.
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Latin America
Fig. 1: Latin America/Carribean Population in 2000: Approaching the Transition
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision
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tion to an urban society is one of the hallmarks of this new century. Mumbai (former Bom-
bay, India) is projected to grow at 2.4 percent per year between now and 2015. A growth rate
of 2.4 percent will double a population in only 29 years. Dhaka (Bangladesh), Karachi (Pak-
istan), and Jakarta (Indonesia) all have projected growth rates of three percent or more.
As in Africa, it should be remembered that, in Asia, urban does not mean mega-city. The
distribution of the urban population by city size is essentially the same as in Africa, with
about 11 percent of the urban population in cities of 10 million or more. Asia’s mega-cities,
although they account for only about four percent of the region’s total population, are fast
becoming even more important centers of commerce and catalysts for development.
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Fig. 3: Total Fertility Rates in Latin America/Carribean, 1950–2000
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision
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Argentina serves as an excellent example of the Latin America pattern, a relatively developed
country with high education levels and with 90 percent of its population considered urban
(Fig. 4). In 1948, Argentina had a crude birth rate of 25 births per 1,000 population, almost
one half century later, that rate had fallen to just below 20. The pattern of fertility decline in
Latin America has featured a tendency, in many cases, for fertility to decline below three chil-
dren per woman, but rather than decline further to two children, level off above it. 
The use of family planning in Latin America is the highest in the developing world (70 per-
cent of couples), even when we consider that figures for Asia include China. In most coun-
tries, the majority of contracepting couples use female sterilization, although traditional
methods, such as rhythm, predominate in Bolivia and Peru.
Education levels in Latin America are generally quite high, with nearly full enrollment in
the primary grades. At the secondary level, Latin America is the only developing region where
girls not only have parity with boys, but actually exceed them.
Latin America has easily been the most rapidly urbanizing region in the developing world.
In 2000, the proportion of the population officially considered urban was more than twice
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Fig. 6: Basic Education in Latin America/Caribbean: The Only Developing Region 
Where Girls Have Parity with Boys
Source: UNESCO 1999 Statistical Yearbook
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Fig. 7: Latin America/Caribbean: 75 Percent Urban in 2000, 83 Percent Urban in 2030
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects: The 1999 Revision
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that of both Africa and Asia. In terms of numbers, growth in the rural population has been
essentially nil for over thirty years. While the number of urban dwellers rose nearly 140 per-
cent between 1970 and 2000 (from 163 to 391 million) the rural population essentially
remained about the same size, increasing by only 5.8 percent (from 121 to 128 million).
The region has the highest percentage of its urban population living in urban areas of 10
million or more of any developing region. United Nations estimates show that about 15 per-
cent of the region’s urban population lives in such “mega-cities” as Mexico City (18 million
in 2000), Sao Paulo (also 18 million), and Buenos Aires (13 million).
44 Latin America
Percent of married women using contraception
Fig. 5: Contraceptive Use in Latin America/Caribbean, 1990s
Source : Population Reference Bureau, 2001 World Population Data Sheet
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Large swings in the birth rate have left their mark on the pyramid of North America, 90 per-
cent of whose population lives in the US. The postwar “baby boom” of 1946 – 1964 pro-
duced a birth cohort of 75 million in the US, and its effects have been felt ever since. A boom-
ing economy during the 1950s, early family formation, and more traditional ideas of the
roles of men and women are many factors that contributed to a sharp rise in births. A very
similar pattern was observed in Canada and is clearly reflected in the “bulge” that peaks
throughout ages 35 – 44 in the pyramid. The baby boom itself was quickly followed by the
extraordinary baby bust of the 1970s. By the late 1960s, the feminist movement in the U.S.
was well underway, with women questioning their traditional roles in society. This was fol-
lowed by the oil crisis of the 1970s. That, and runaway inflation, necessitated that many
households have two earners and the labor force was changed forever. The spread of modern
contraception also meant that couples could plan their fertility and avoid “surprises.”
To call the U.S. a developed country with developing country growth potential is no exag-
geration. By 1950, the U.S. population had reached 150 million, about twice its size in 1900.
Surprisingly, it nearly doubled again by the end of the past century. U.S. Census Bureau pro-
jections show the population rising to nearly 600 million at the end of this century, with the
curve continuing to rise after that. In the graph (Fig. 3), the “medium” scenario assumes that
fertility will remain stable at today’s value of about two children per woman and that net
immigration will also continue at today’s level, about 800,000 per year. The effect of immi-
gration is clearly evident in the graph below, which also includes a zero immigration assump-
tion, assuming that immigration suddenly ceased altogether at the beginning of the period.
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North America
Fig. 1: North America’s Population in 2000: Baby Booms and Baby Busts But No End to Growth
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision
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Fig. 4: Canada in the 21st Century: The Low Birth Rate Leads to Only Modest Growth
Source: Statistics Canada
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In Canada, the prospect for future growth is somewhat different. The U.S. and Canadian birth
rates followed an almost identical path throughout most of the 20th Century, both recording
birth rate declines during the Depression years of the 1930s, a sharp rise during the postwar
baby boom, and another decline during the 1970s. But, the U.S. birth rate rose again in the
late 1980s, returning to replacement level of just over two children per woman by 1990,
where it has remained. Canada’s TFR has now fallen to levels similar to some of the lowest in
Europe, 1.4, although it continues to be a country open to immigration. Thus, there is likely
to be a sharp difference in population growth between the two neighbors.
Fertility rates in the U.S. are another example of the divergence in trends observed in other
countries and regions. The white population, typically referred to as the majority, has a TFR of
1.9, below replacement, but on a par with some of the highest TFRs in Europe, such as that of
France. The TFR for other ethnic groups, particularly Hispanics, is much higher, often reflect-
ing fertility of the home country. Hispanic Americans have averaged about three children per
woman for many decades, suggesting that the wide difference between whites and Hispanics
will continue for some time. During the 1990s, the TFR for Black, or African American,
women decreased for the first time in many decades, partly due to a drop in teenage births.
The population of the U.S. has been undergoing a transformation since its very founding,
as immigrants arrived first from Northern and Western Europe, than from Southern and East-
ern Europe, and finally, after changes to immigration law in 1965, from Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. The origins of the different groups varies from long term Hispanics in the Southwest
to recent refugees from Africa and Asia. The result is that this “melting pot” society will virtu-
ally have no majority – defined as the white, non-Hispanic population in the pie charts – by
2050 (Fig. 7). Indeed many argue that, by 2050, the very concept of “majority” will cease to
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Fig. 2: Population of the U.S., 1900–2000
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
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exist. The 2000 Census count was about 7 million higher than expected and may change
some assumptions about future immigration trends when the U.S. Census Bureau prepares
new population projections.
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Fig. 5: Total Fertility in the U.S., 1990–2000:
Significant Differences by Ethnic Groups
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Few population pyramids have as many stories to tell as that of Europe. The overall shape of
the pyramid is virtually unprecedented in history. While there have been “baby busts” in the
past, the unusually protracted period of extremely low birth rates in Europe since the 1970s
has permanently altered the shape of Europe’s age-sex distribution. Even more significantly, it
has also altered the future of Europe’s population in ways that were never anticipated.
Looking at the pyramid from the base, we can see the effects of particularly low fertility in
Europe during the 1990s as the number of young people below age ten has been sharply cur-
tailed. In fact, each age group from 30 – 34 is progressively smaller than the one below it. Sev-
eral other interesting aspects can be observed, such as the drop in births during the Second
World War (see ages 55 – 59) and the rather large dearth of males, ages 75 and higher due to
excess mortality during the war. It is notable that many European health systems will soon
have to cope with a new demand: rapidly rising numbers of elderly men in addition to the
number of elderly women who have always been present due to the higher life expectancy of
females generally. This is especially true in the European countries of the former USSR,  where
very low life expectancy and high mortality in World War II resulted in unusually small num-
bers of men in the older age groups.
Europe’s age distribution poses particular problems for health and social security systems.
The decline in the number of younger people in the population goes hand in hand with the
rise of numbers of the aged to create serious problems for funding such systems, a matter of
lively debate across the continent. 
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Fig. 1: Europe’s Population in 2000:
Age Group 0–4 Only Two-Thirds of 35–39
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision
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Fig. 2: Italy in 2000: Tomorrow’s Parents Nearly Half in Number
Source: Council of Europe, Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, 2000
2,7
2,8 2,8
4,7
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
3,5
4,0
4,5
5,0
0-4 5-9 10–14 30–34
Age
The net result of Europe’s low birth rate is that most scenarios project population decline in
all four regions. The decline of Eastern Europe is especially dramatic. This region, half of
whose population is in Russia, experienced rapidly plunging birth rates, most notably follow-
ing the breakup of the former USSR and the economic disruption that political upheaval
caused. Additionally, collapsing health systems have resulted in rising death rates in many
countries of the former USSR and Eastern Europe.
It is important to note the graph below illustrates the UN’s medium projection, which uses
the assumption that birth rates will rise gradually throughout Europe, reaching an average
TFR of 1.8 by 2050, up from 1.4 at present.
What will Europe’s share of the global population be? From more than one in five world
residents in 1950, Europe’s population will likely comprise a mere 6 percent by 2050 (it is
about 12 percent today). This UN projection assumes that annual net migration to Europe
will average about 400,000 per year, although national policies on immigration are difficult
to anticipate. Additionally, the assumption is made that the very low fertility prevalent
throughout the continent will not continue, as noted above.
Given the key role of fertility in Europe’s future, a closer look at recent trends is warranted. In
the graph above, several countries that are representative of their region are shown. Very low
fertility began in Western and Northern Europe, with countries such as Germany and Sweden
receiving considerable press attention in the 1970s and 1980s. Southern European countries
were late to join the trend to lower birth rates, but then did so quite swiftly. As a result, some
of the world’s lowest birth rates are now found in that region. In Russia, fertility had always
been higher than in the West and plunged to its current low level quite late, in the 1990s. Ire-
land had been something of an exception on the European scene, with a very high birth rate
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Italy serves as an excellent country-level example of the manner by which population decline
can be “pre-programmed” (Fig. 2). Italy’s birth rate, at an historic low of just 1.2 children per
woman, now means that the youngest age groups – the parents of tomorrow – are only about
half the size of those in the prime childbearing age group of 30-34. Italy’s future population
is not simply a matter of an increase in the birth rate. Even if the birth rate rises to a level that
few now expect, say, two children per woman, Italy’s population will decline from 57 million
today to 46 million in 2050 and still be in decline at that point. Astoundingly, if Italy’s TFR
were to remain at today’s level, Italy’s population would drop to 40 million, with 45 percent
of the population above the age of 60. 
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Fig. 5: Total Fertility Rate, Selected Countries of Europe 1960–2000
Source: Council of Europe, Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, 2000 national statistical offices and EUROSTAT
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The age pattern of fertility in Denmark serves as an excellent example of the shift in the age of
childbearing and also as an example of how fertility might rise. Low birth rates in Europe are often
attributed to “delayed” childbearing., i.e., fertility falls as women delay the onset of childbearing
and then rises as they begin to have babies. In Denmark, the shift of the curve to the upper ages is
very evident and it did, in fact, accompany an increase in the TFR. But Denmark has proven to be
an exception in Europe and its TFR in 1999 of 1.73 was actually down from a peak of 1.81 in 1994.
What can be said regarding future fertility in Europe? For one, fertility decline generally
seems to have run its course by the end of the 20th Century. Indeed, by 2000, there is some
indication that a very modest recovery may be underway in some countries. Past trends and
recent changes vary considerably by country, and especially among regions. Still, in the table
below, an attempt has been made to classify the trend. As always, it must be kept in mind that
birth rates can be rather volatile and any “recoveries” noted thus far could be quite temporary
and brought to a swift end by any economic downturns. In addition, the TFR in several coun-
tries had risen to a higher level between the past low point and 2000, the most notable exam-
ple of which is Sweden, as mention above.
In the table, the current 2000 TFR is compared to the low point for each country. In fact, it
may be said that only three countries currently stand out as having truly notable increases in
the TFR, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands.  France’s recovery has been very recent, with
the TFR “jumping” by 0.1 in just one year, from 1999 to 2000. So, even here, recent trends are
rather inconclusive. It does appear, however, that fertility has reached a “cellar” value in many
of the wealthier countries of Europe but that there is scant evidence of a general rise.
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by any standard well into the 1970s and 1980s. But, by the 1990s, even Ireland had fallen
below replacement. The most unusual case is that of Sweden, whose TFR rose sharply at the
end of the 1980s and even rose briefly above replacement in 1991. This remarkable develop-
ment was widely hailed in Europe, but the trend was temporary and somewhat artificial. In
the late 1980s, changes to regulations providing for a woman’s income during maternity
leave made it very advantageous for Swedish couples to have a second child within 24
months of the first. Thus, those couples who had planned a second child all along did so
much sooner than they might have otherwise. After 1990, the “timing effect” of those births
had run its course, the economy turned sour, and the TFR fell once again. Ironically, Sweden’s
current birth rate of 1.5 is now the lowest in its history.
Along with the overall decline in fertility in Europe, there have been significant shifts in the
age pattern of fertility. In the graph, birth rates by age of mother are shown for three different
time periods in Germany. The pattern shown for 1960 might be considered “normal” in the
sense that childbearing was traditionally concentrated in the early and late 20s and that the
higher curve results in a TFR of 2.4, more than sufficient to maintain modest population
growth. By 1998, childbearing in the early 20s had fallen drastically as women delayed child-
bearing. Different factors are cited in this sharp change in family formation, depending on
the country: the cost of living, many more women opting for full-time careers, longer periods
of education, insufficient family support allowances as well as support especially aiming at
women, and changes in life outlook. 
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Fig. 6: Birth Rates by Age of Mother, Germany
Source: Council of Europe, Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, 2000 
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Fig. 7: Age Specific Birth Rates in Denmark, at the Low Point of Fertility and After the Effects 
of “Delayed Childbearing”
Source: Council of Europe, Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, 2000 
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For some European countries where low fertility has now caused deaths to exceed births, only
immigration has forestalled population decline. Throughout the 1990s, there was a general
downward trend in immigration, although the picture is very mixed. The German experience
was radically different from other countries following the breakup of the USSR and
Yugoslavia as well  as the reunification of East and West Germany. Large numbers of refugees
and asylees, in addition to “Aussiedler” (people of German heritage who had lived in other
areas, especially Eastern Europe) sought permanent residence.
As the 21st century begins, there is considerable evidence that attitudes may be changing
toward immigrants for several reasons. For one, it is recognized that labor force shortages are
likely to result or that a shrinking labor force will mean fewer social taxes collected to support
rapidly growing numbers of retirees. Labor shortages can also be acute in certain needed
occupational fields, which can be quickly filled by immigrants. Still, although trends can be
quite variable, there has been a very general downward trend in most countries during the
1990s and few European countries can match the rate of immigration in the U.S., at about 3.5
per 1,000 population.
Foreign population is often defined differently from country to country, such as “foreign
born” or “persons of foreign citizenship.” Figure 10 shows changes in foreign population as
collected by the OECD. Generally, the number of countries with significant numbers of for-
eign population is not large, but nearly every country shows an increase since the 1980s. Sig-
nificantly, several countries now have percentages of foreign population that are quite close to
that of the United States (defined as “foreign born”), a country well known as a “country of
immigrants.” 
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Fig. 8: Looking at Western Europe’s Most Recent Fertility Trends: Is a Recovery Underway?
Sources: Council of Europe, Recent Demographic Trends in Europe, 2000, national statistical offices, EUROSTAT
Note: In the cases of Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, the TFR in 2000 is the lowest in history or very close to it
Low Point of TFR High Point of TFR TFR (2000) Change
(if any) from
TFR Year TFR Year Low Point
Countries Evidencing Denmark 1,38 1983 1,81 1994 1,76 0,38
Some TFR Recovery: Netherlands 1,47 1983 na na 1,72 0,25
France 1,65 1993 na na 1,89 0,24
Norway 1,66 1984 1,93 1990 1,85 0,19
Finland 1,59 1987 1,85 1994 1,73 0,14
Belgium 1,51 1985 1,66 1991 1,65 0,14
Portugal 1,40 1995 na na 1,54 0,14
Countries with Little Germany 1,24 1994 na na 1,34 0,10
or No TFR Recovery: Italy 1,15 1998 na na 1,25 0,10
Spain 1,17 1996 na na 1,25 0,08
Ireland 1,84 1995 na na 1,89 0,05
Austria 1,32 1999 na na 1,32 0,00
Great Britain 1,68 1999 na na 1,64 –0,04
Sweden 1,60 1978 2,11 1991 1,54 –0,06
Switzerland 1,60 1978 na na 1,50 –0,10
Fig. 9: Immigration to Europe, 1990–2000
Source: Council of Europe, Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, 2000, EUROSTAT
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While falling fertility has been a major demographic story throughout Europe, rising mortal-
ity has been an unfortunate one in the East. In Russia, life expectancy at birth had risen to
respectably high levels by 1980, about 62 for men and 73 for women, although well below
that of western Europe. Throughout the 1980s, life expectancy remained relatively stable. In
the wake of the breakup of the USSR, however, the phenomenon of declining life expectancy
in a country considered industrialized began. By the early 1990s, life expectancy for men
dropped to about 58 years, about the same level as the United States in 1910. Some recovery
was recorded in the mid-1990s, but yet another decrease was recorded in the late 1990s.
Although such causes of death as alcoholism and suicide receive the most media attention,
the biggest killer in Russia is circulatory disease. The rise in deaths from circulatory disease
following the collapse of the Soviet Union is an unheard-of consequence and something
rarely seen in modern times. Many reasons are given, including the lack of medicines for the
treatment of hypertension, stress caused by the loss of jobs, and the end of what had seemed
to be a secure and pre-determined future. For males, deaths from accidents may often be alco-
hol-related, particularly when we note that accidents fell during the 1980s anti-alcohol cam-
paigns of the Gorbachev era. 
The rise in anticipated length of life throughout the industrialized world has been one of
the major demographic developments of the past 100 years. In Europe, a life expectancy at
birth of over 80 years for females is not uncommon and there is considerable debate over just
how high the expected length of life can go. A particularly sharp increase is expected in the
population of the “oldest old,” – age 80 and over – which in 2000 numbered about 69 mil-
lion, one percent of the world total. By 2050, this group will number 379 million and rise to
four percent of global population.
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Fig. 11: Life Expectancy at Birth, Russia 1980–1999
Source: GOSKOMSTAT, The Demographic Yearbook of Russia 2000
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Fig. 12: Major Causes of Death, Russia 1965–1999
Fig. 13: Causes of Death, Russia 1965–1999
Source: GOSKOMSTAT, The Demographic Yearbook of Russia 2000
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Few topics attract more attention and debate in Europe than the aging of the population and
the implications it will have for pension security. The future will certainly see the proportion
above actual retirement age rise to unprecedented proportions. In the charts (Fig. 15a), the
UN medium projection anticipates a full 36 percent of the population above 60 in Western
Europe. This projection also assumes a rise in fertility from a TFR of 1.5 today to 1.8 by 2050.
But, even if fertility were to rise to the replacement level by 2050, the proportion over 60 will
still rise to 33 percent. Thus, an aging society seems inevitable in Europe. 
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Fig. 14: Life Expectancy at Birth, France and Italy
Source: Council of Europe, Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, 2000
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Looking to the world of the next few decades, what can we foresee?
 The continuance of low birth rates in Europe and North America with true “recovery” high-
ly dependent on support for families and women as well as on  the economic and political
outlook that couples perceive.
 Sustained growth of population in the developing countries with growth concentrating
more and more in those countries with weak population policies and/or little resources to
implement them.
 Immigration. Until such time as the economies of developing countries no longer “push”
emigrants to seek a better life elsewhere, migration will continue to rise. Rising pressure
through migration from outside as well as declining population sizes within will sustain
the debates that will rage in parliaments and the media of industrialized countries about
just what their policies towards admitting foreigners should be.
 AIDS. Will countries, especially in Africa, react in time to curb this insidious killer? No dis-
ease has emerged in modern times with its potential to change population growth or
decline prospects as has this.
Our intention, with this Report, is to keep the reader informed on the direction demographic
trends are actually taking each year. While demographic change is but one of the factors that
will shape our 21st Century world, it affects many of our policy decisions and is itself affected
by world events. We hope that you have found this Report useful and informative and look
forward to your comments as to the direction it should take in future editions.
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The first edition of the World Population Dynamics Report gives a picture of a world undergoing
constant demographic change, change that highlights the rapidly diverging paths in popula-
tion trends not only among the world’s regions, but within those regions and even within
countries. The 20th Century launched the world into a series of demographic changes that are
likely never to be repeated. By far its most significant feature was the elimination of a large
menu of diseases that today are virtually unknown, such as smallpox, epidemic influenza,
and yaws.  Consider, for a moment, our experience with mortality in the past:
Abraham’s mother died when she was thirty-five and he was nine. Prior to her death, she had three
children: Abraham’s brother died in infancy and his sister died in her early twenties. His first love,
Anne, died at age nineteen. Of the four sons born to Abraham and his wife Mary, only one survived to
maturity. Clearly, a life with so many bereavements was very different from most of our lives today.
But this was not the Biblical Abraham, but Abraham Lincoln, the US president of the mid-
19th Century. Today, infant mortality is virtually non-existent in the industrialized countries
and has fallen to historically low levels in many developing countries. Life expectancy at birth
has reached 80 years in some countries and continues to rise, absent high prevalence of AIDS.
The decline in death rates in the developing countries after 1950 resulted in population
growth rates that had never before been seen, the primary reason why the 21st Century saw the
world begin with 1.6 billion people and end it with 6.1.
Following the mortality revolution, a major change took place in fertility. Social changes
produced birth rates in industrialized countries whose levels are now so low that they were
never anticipated and are certain to result in populations that decline in size even as they see
proportions of elderly rise. That, in turn, caused all of global population growth to shift to the
developing countries. But, at the same time, concern over rapid population growth also
caused birth rates to decline in the majority of developing countries, even those which lacked
significant economic development. 
What of the future? It is clear that the 21st Century will see some conclusion to the popula-
tion story begun in the 20th and result in a world that would barely be recognizable in 1900.
The key issue has been, and remains, the future course of fertility in developing countries. It is
that that will determine if we leave the 21st Century with a global population of  7 billion or
15 billion, or some other number. As fertility declines in some developing countries, but not
in others, divergent trends will emerge and provide us with clues to what the future will hold. 
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Conclusion
Total Fertility Rate (TFR)
A summary measure that gives the average number of children a woman would bear during
her lifetime, assuming that the birth rate of a given year remains constant. For example, if
women in France were to have children at the same rate that all women in France did during
2000, the average French woman would have 1.9 children during her lifetime.
Replacement Level Fertility
The number of children per woman that will ultimately result in a population that neither
increases nor decreases in size. Typically, this is about two children per woman, or per couple.
When a couple has two children, they simply “replace” themselves, not increasing or decreas-
ing the size of each successive generation. Expressed in terms of the total fertility rate, replace-
ment level fertility is 2.06 in countries with high life expectancy. The additional “.06” is due to
the fact that, worldwide, there are about five percent more male babies born than female (the
“sex ratio at birth”) and to the fact that not all women live to the end of their childbearing
years (conventionally assumed to be 15 – 49). In countries with low life expectancy, replace-
ment level fertility can be as high as 3.0 children because relatively large numbers of women
do not survive until the end of their childbearing years.
Enrollment Rates
The percentage of children and youth enrolled in a given level of education, such as primary
and secondary. Gross enrollment rates (used in this report) are calculated by dividing all stu-
dents enrolled in a given level by the population appropriate for that level, typically 6 –11 for
the primary school. Since enrollment often includes children who repeat grades, gross enroll-
ment rates can exceed 100 percent. Net enrollment rates only include enrolled students of the
appropriate age for the level, but are less available due to the more detailed data needed to
calculate them.
Infant Mortality Rate (IMR)
The annual number of deaths to infants under age one per 1,000 births in the year. The infant
mortality rate is often considered a good indicator of health conditions in any country.
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Crude Birth Rate (CBR)
The annual number of births per 1,000 population. Currently, it varies from a very low 8 per
1,000 in several countries of the former Soviet Union (such as Latvia and Ukraine) to 50 in
several African countries (such as Angola and Mali). In virtually every country, a high crude
birth rate indicates a high level of the total fertility rate (see) and a low crude birth rate indi-
cates a low level of the total fertility rate. Only where the age-sex structure of a population is
unusual, such as that caused by high immigration of male workers in Persian Gulf states, will
the crude birth not a be a good indicator of fertility.
Crude Death Rate (CDR)
The annual number of deaths per 1,000 population. The crude death rate is heavily influ-
enced by the proportion of elderly in a population and is not, by itself, a good indicator of
the overall level of health and mortality in any particular country. For example, life expectan-
cy at birth (see) in Sweden is a high 80 years, but its crude birth rate is 11 per 1,000. In
Nicaragua, life expectancy is considerably less, 68 years, but the crude death rate is only 6, due
to a much higher proportion of young people in the population.
Rate of Natural Increase
The difference between the crude birth and death rate, conventionally expressed as a percent-
age. Thus, for Pakistan, with a crude birth rate of 39 and a crude death rate of 11:
39 – 11 = 28.  When divided by 10 = 2.8 percent 
The rate of natural increase can, of course, also be negative. For Russia,
8 – 15 = – 7.  When divided by 10 = – 0.7 percent
Population Growth Rate
The rate of natural increase adjusted for the effects of net immigration or emigration, if any.
Life Expectancy at Birth
The average number of years a newborn baby can be expected to live given the mortality rates
prevalent in the year of its birth. During the course of one’s lifetime, the number of years one
can be expected to live often rises as progress is made against disease. Life expectancy at birth
is greatly affected by the level of the infant mortality rate and by deaths from AIDS, which
remove people from the population at early ages.
Age-Sex  Structure of a Population
The composition of the population by age groups, typically five year age groups such as 0 – 4,
5 – 9 up to some terminal age group such as 85+, and by sex.  Very young populations have as
much as 45 – 50 percent of their population in the age groups below 15, while “old” popula-
tions today have 15 – 17 percent of their populations age 65 and over. Age-sex structure is
often illustrated by a horizontal bar graph referred to as a “population pyramid.”
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Both (in years) Male (in years) Female (in years)
1995–2000 1995–2000 1995–2000
Tunisia 69.5 Tunisia 68.4 Tunisia 70.7
Western Sahara 61.4 Western Sahara 59.8 Western Sahara 63.1
Southern Africa 55.4 Southern Africa 52.9 Southern Africa 57.9
Botswana 44.4 Botswana 43.8 Botswana 44.7
Lesotho 51.2 Lesotho 50.7 Lesotho 51.6
Namibia 45.1 Namibia 44.9 Namibia 45.3
South Africa 56.7 South Africa 53.9 South Africa 59.5
Swaziland 50.8 Swaziland 49.3 Swaziland 52.2
Western Africa 50.0 Western Africa 49.3 Western Africa 50.7
Benin 53.5 Benin 51.8 Benin 55.3
Burkina Faso 45.3 Burkina Faso 44.2 Burkina Faso 46.2
Cape Verde 68.9 Cape Verde 65.5 Cape Verde 71.3
Côte d’Ivoire 47.7 Côte d’Ivoire 47.4 Côte d’Ivoire 48.1
Gambia 45.4 Gambia 44.0 Gambia 46.8
Ghana 56.3 Ghana 55.0 Ghana 57.6
Guinea 46.5 Guinea 46.0 Guinea 47.0
Guinea-Bissau 44.1 Guinea-Bissau 42.7 Guinea-Bissau 45.5
Liberia 48.1 Liberia 47.1 Liberia 49.0
Mali 50.9 Mali 49.8 Mali 51.8
Mauritania 50.5 Mauritania 48.9 Mauritania 52.1
Niger 44.2 Niger 43.9 Niger 44.5
Nigeria 51.3 Nigeria 51.0 Nigeria 51.5
Senegal 52.3 Senegal 50.5 Senegal 54.2
Sierra Leone 37.3 Sierra Leone 36.0 Sierra Leone 38.6
Togo 51.3 Togo 50.1 Togo 52.6
ASIA 65.8 ASIA 64.3 ASIA 67.4
Eastern Asia 70.9 Eastern Asia 68.7 Eastern Asia 73.4
China 69.8 China 67.9 China 72.0
China, Hong Kong SAR 79.1 China, Hong Kong SAR 76.5 China, Hong Kong SAR 82.0
China, Macao SAR 78.5 China, Macao SAR 76.1 China, Macao SAR 80.8
Democratic People’s Democratic People’s Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea 63.1 Republic of Korea 60.5 Republic of Korea 66.0
Japan 80.5 Japan 77.0 Japan 83.8
Mongolia 61.9 Mongolia 59.9 Mongolia 63.9
Republic of Korea 74.3 Republic of Korea 70.6 Republic of Korea 78.1
South-central Asia 61.5 South-central Asia 61.0 South-central Asia 62.0
Afghanistan 42.5 Afghanistan 42.3 Afghanistan 42.8
Bangladesh 58.1 Bangladesh 58.1 Bangladesh 58.2
Bhutan 60.7 Bhutan 59.5 Bhutan 62.0
India 62.3 India 61.9 India 62.6
Iran Iran Iran 
(Islamic Republic of) 68.0 (Islamic Republic of) 67.3 (Islamic Republic of) 68.8
Kazakhstan 64.1 Kazakhstan 58.6 Kazakhstan 70.0
Kyrgyzstan 66.9 Kyrgyzstan 62.8 Kyrgyzstan 71.1
Maldives 65.4 Maldives 66.3 Maldives 64.5
Nepal 57.3 Nepal 57.6 Nepal 57.1
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Both (in years) Male (in years) Female (in years)
1995–2000 1995–2000 1995–2000
World 65.0 World 62.9 World 67.1
More developed More developed More developed
regions 74.9 regions 71.1 regions 78.6
Less developed 62.9 Less developed 61.4 Less developed 64.5
regions regions regions
Less developed regions Less developed regions Less developed regions
excluding China 60.9 excluding China 59.5 excluding China 62.2
AFRICA 51.4 AFRICA 50.3 AFRICA 52.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 48.6 Sub-Saharan Africa 47.6 Sub-Saharan Africa 49.6
Eastern Africa 45.7 Eastern Africa 44.8 Eastern Africa 46.5
Burundi 40.6 Burundi 39.6 Burundi 41.5
Comoros 58.8 Comoros 57.4 Comoros 60.2
Djibouti 45.5 Djibouti 43.9 Djibouti 46.9
Eritrea 51.5 Eritrea 50.1 Eritrea 53.0
Ethiopia 44.5 Ethiopia 43.6 Ethiopia 45.4
Kenya 52.2 Kenya 51.2 Kenya 53.2
Madagascar 51.6 Madagascar 50.5 Madagascar 52.8
Malawi 40.7 Malawi 40.7 Malawi 40.7
Mauritius 70.7 Mauritius 66.9 Mauritius 74.8
Mozambique 40.6 Mozambique 39.4 Mozambique 41.8
Réunion 73.8 Réunion 69.4 Réunion 78.3
Rwanda 39.4 Rwanda 38.7 Rwanda 40.2
Somalia 46.9 Somalia 45.4 Somalia 48.5
Uganda 41.9 Uganda 41.4 Uganda 42.5
United Republic United Republic United Republic 
of Tanzania 51.1 of Tanzania 50.0 of Tanzania 52.3
Zambia 40.5 Zambia 40.9 Zambia 40.1
Zimbabwe 42.9 Zimbabwe 43.2 Zimbabwe 42.7
Middle Africa 48.9 Middle Africa 47.5 Middle Africa 50.2
Angola 44.6 Angola 43.3 Angola 46.0
Cameroon 50.0 Cameroon 49.1 Cameroon 50.8
Central African Republic 44.3 Central African Republic 42.7 Central African Republic 46.0
Chad 45.2 Chad 43.9 Chad 46.4
Congo 50.9 Congo 48.8 Congo 53.1
Democratic Republic Democratic Republic Democratic Republic
of the Congo 50.5 of the Congo 49.2 of the Congo 51.9
Equatorial Guinea 50.0 Equatorial Guinea 48.4 Equatorial Guinea 51.6
Gabon 52.4 Gabon 51.2 Gabon 53.7
Northern Africa 64.6 Northern Africa 63.0 Northern Africa 66.1
Algeria 68.9 Algeria 67.5 Algeria 70.3
Egypt 66.3 Egypt 64.7 Egypt 67.9
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 70.0 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 68.3 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 72.2
Morocco 66.6 Morocco 64.8 Morocco 68.5
Sudan 55.0 Sudan 53.6 Sudan 56.4
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Life Expectancy at Birth
Both (in years) Male (in years) Female (in years)
1995–2000 1995–2000 1995–2000
Romania 69.8 Romania 66.5 Romania 73.3
Russian Federation 66.1 Russian Federation 60.2 Russian Federation 72.5
Slovakia 72.8 Slovakia 68.8 Slovakia 76.8
Ukraine 68.1 Ukraine 62.7 Ukraine 73.5
Northern Europe 76.7 Northern Europe 73.9 Northern Europe 79.6
Channel Islands 77.6 Channel Islands 75.2 Channel Islands 79.9
Denmark 75.9 Denmark 73.4 Denmark 78.3
Estonia 70.0 Estonia 64.3 Estonia 75.6
Finland 77.2 Finland 73.4 Finland 80.7
Iceland 78.9 Iceland 76.6 Iceland 81.3
Ireland 76.1 Ireland 73.5 Ireland 78.8
Latvia 69.6 Latvia 63.7 Latvia 75.4
Lithuania 71.4 Lithuania 66.1 Lithuania 76.7
Norway 78.1 Norway 75.2 Norway 81.1
Sweden 79.3 Sweden 76.8 Sweden 81.8
United Kingdom 77.2 United Kingdom 74.7 United Kingdom 79.7
Southern Europe 77.0 Southern Europe 73.7 Southern Europe 80.2
Albania 72.8 Albania 69.9 Albania 75.9
Bosnia and Herzegovina 73.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina 70.5 Bosnia and Herzegovina 75.9
Croatia 73.3 Croatia 69.3 Croatia 77.3
Greece 78.0 Greece 75.4 Greece 80.7
Italy 78.2 Italy 75.0 Italy 81.4
Malta 77.6 Malta 74.9 Malta 80.2
Portugal 75.2 Portugal 71.6 Portugal 78.8
Slovenia 75.0 Slovenia 71.1 Slovenia 78.6
Spain 78.1 Spain 74.6 Spain 81.8
TFYR Macedonia 72.7 TFYR Macedonia 70.6 TFYR Macedonia 74.8
Yugoslavia 72.2 Yugoslavia 69.9 Yugoslavia 74.6
Western Europe 77.7 Western Europe 74.3 Western Europe 80.9
Austria 77.7 Austria 74.4 Austria 80.7
Belgium 77.9 Belgium 74.7 Belgium 81.1
France 78.1 France 74.2 France 82.0
Germany 77.3 Germany 74.0 Germany 80.3
Luxembourg 77.0 Luxembourg 73.6 Luxembourg 80.1
Netherlands 77.9 Netherlands 75.1 Netherlands 80.5
Switzerland 78.6 Switzerland 75.4 Switzerland 81.8
LATIN AMERICA LATIN AMERICA LATIN AMERICA
AND CARIBBEAN 69.3 AND CARIBBEAN 66.1 AND CARIBBEAN 72.6
Caribbean 67.5 Caribbean 65.0 Caribbean 70.2
Bahamas 69.1 Bahamas 64.8 Bahamas 73.5
Barbados 76.4 Barbados 73.7 Barbados 78.7
Cuba 75.7 Cuba 74.2 Cuba 78.0
Dominican Republic 67.3 Dominican Republic 65.3 Dominican Republic 69.9
Guadeloupe 77.3 Guadeloupe 73.6 Guadeloupe 80.9
Haiti 52.0 Haiti 49.1 Haiti 55.0
Jamaica 74.8 Jamaica 72.9 Jamaica 76.8
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1995–2000 1995–2000 1995–2000
Pakistan 59.0 Pakistan 59.2 Pakistan 58.9
Sri Lanka 71.6 Sri Lanka 69.0 Sri Lanka 74.7
Tajikistan 67.2 Tajikistan 64.2 Tajikistan 70.2
Turkmenistan 65.4 Turkmenistan 61.9 Turkmenistan 68.9
Uzbekistan 68.3 Uzbekistan 65.3 Uzbekistan 71.3
South-eastern Asia 65.3 South-eastern Asia 63.2 South-eastern Asia 67.5
Brunei Darussalam 75.5 Brunei Darussalam 73.4 Brunei Darussalam 78.1
Cambodia 56.5 Cambodia 54.3 Cambodia 58.5
East Timor 47.5 East Timor 46.7 East Timor 48.4
Indonesia 65.1 Indonesia 63.3 Indonesia 67.0
Lao People’s Lao People’s Lao People’s
Democratic Republic 52.5 Democratic Republic 51.3 Democratic Republic 53.8
Malaysia 71.9 Malaysia 69.6 Malaysia 74.5
Myanmar 55.8 Myanmar 53.6 Myanmar 58.3
Philippines 68.6 Philippines 66.5 Philippines 70.7
Singapore 77.1 Singapore 74.9 Singapore 79.3
Thailand 69.6 Thailand 66.7 Thailand 72.6
Viet Nam 67.2 Viet Nam 64.9 Viet Nam 69.6
Western Asia 67.9 Western Asia 65.8 Western Asia 70.0
Armenia 72.4 Armenia 69.3 Armenia 75.4
Azerbaijan 71.0 Azerbaijan 67.2 Azerbaijan 74.5
Bahrain 72.9 Bahrain 71.1 Bahrain 75.3
Cyprus 77.8 Cyprus 75.5 Cyprus 80.0
Georgia 72.7 Georgia 68.5 Georgia 76.8
Iraq 58.7 Iraq 57.2 Iraq 60.3
Israel 78.3 Israel 76.3 Israel 80.2
Jordan 69.7 Jordan 68.5 Jordan 71.0
Kuwait 75.9 Kuwait 74.1 Kuwait 78.2
Lebanon 72.6 Lebanon 71.1 Lebanon 74.1
Occupied Palestinian Occupied Palestinian Occupied Palestinian 
Territory 71.4 Territory 69.8 Territory 73.0
Oman 70.5 Oman 69.2 Oman 72.0
Qatar 68.9 Qatar 68.1 Qatar 70.6
Saudi Arabia 70.9 Saudi Arabia 69.9 Saudi Arabia 72.2
Syrian Arab Republic 70.5 Syrian Arab Republic 69.4 Syrian Arab Republic 71.6
Turkey 69.0 Turkey 66.5 Turkey 71.7
United Arab Emirates 74.6 United Arab Emirates 73.3 United Arab Emirates 77.6
Yemen 59.4 Yemen 58.2 Yemen 60.4
EUROPE 73.2 EUROPE 69.1 EUROPE 77.4
Eastern Europe 68.2 Eastern Europe 63.0 Eastern Europe 73.6
Belarus 68.5 Belarus 62.8 Belarus 74.4
Bulgaria 70.8 Bulgaria 67.1 Bulgaria 74.8
Czech Republic 74.3 Czech Republic 70.9 Czech Republic 77.7
Hungary 70.7 Hungary 66.3 Hungary 75.1
Poland 72.8 Poland 68.6 Poland 77.0
Republic of Moldova 66.6 Republic of Moldova 62.8 Republic of Moldova 70.3
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Total Mid-Year Population (in Million)
1950 2000 2050
World 2,519,495 6,056,715 9,322,251
More developed regions 813,574 1,191,429 1,181,108
Less developed regions 1,705,921 4,865,286 8,141,143
Less developed regions excluding China 1,148,997 3,582,849 6,668,910
AFRICA 220,888 793,627 2,000,383
Sub-Saharan Africa 176,776 650,573 1,760,359
Eastern Africa 65,278 250,318 691,116
Burundi 2,456 6,356 20,218
Comoros 173 706 1,900
Djibouti 62 632 1,068
Eritrea 1,140 3,659 10,028
Ethiopia 18,434 62,908 186,452
Kenya 6,265 30,669 55,368
Madagascar 4,230 15,970 47,030
Malawi 2,881 11,308 31,114
Mauritius 493 1,161 1,426
Mozambique 6,198 18,292 38,837
Réunion 248 721 1,002
Rwanda 2,120 7,609 18,523
Seychelles 34 80 145
Somalia 2,264 8,778 40,936
Uganda 5,210 23,300 101,524
United Republic of Tanzania 7,886 35,119 82,740
Zambia 2,440 10,421 29,262
Zimbabwe 2,744 12,627 23,546
Middle Africa 26,316 95,404 340,645
Angola 4,131 13,134 53,328
Cameroon 4,466 14,876 32,284
Central African Republic 1,314 3,717 8,195
Chad 2,658 7,885 27,732
Congo 808 3,018 10,744
Democratic Republic of the Congo 12,184 50,948 203,527
Equatorial Guinea 226 457 1,378
Gabon 469 1,230 3,164
Sao Tome and Principe 60 138 294
Northern Africa 53,302 174,150 303,555
Algeria 8,753 30,291 51,180
Egypt 21,834 67,884 113,840
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 1,029 5,290 9,969
Morocco 8,953 29,878 50,361
Sudan 9,190 31,095 63,530
Tunisia 3,530 9,459 14,076
Western Sahara 14 252 599
Southern Africa 15,581 49,567 56,942
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1995–2000 1995–2000 1995–2000
Martinique 78.8 Martinique 75.5 Martinique 82.0
Netherlands Antilles 75.5 Netherlands Antilles 72.5 Netherlands Antilles 78.4
Puerto Rico 74.9 Puerto Rico 70.4 Puerto Rico 79.6
Saint Lucia 73.0 Saint Lucia 70.3 Saint Lucia 75.6
Trinidad and Tobago 73.8 Trinidad and Tobago 71.5 Trinidad and Tobago 76.2
Central America 71.0 Central America 68.2 Central America 73.9
Belize 73.6 Belize 72.4 Belize 75.0
Costa Rica 76.0 Costa Rica 74.3 Costa Rica 78.9
El Salvador 69.1 El Salvador 66.5 El Salvador 72.5
Guatemala 64.0 Guatemala 61.4 Guatemala 67.2
Honduras 65.6 Honduras 63.2 Honduras 68.7
Mexico 72.2 Mexico 69.5 Mexico 75.5
Nicaragua 67.7 Nicaragua 65.7 Nicaragua 70.4
Panama 73.6 Panama 71.8 Panama 76.4
South America 68.9 South America 65.5 South America 72.5
Argentina 72.9 Argentina 69.7 Argentina 76.8
Bolivia 61.4 Bolivia 59.8 Bolivia 63.2
Brazil 67.2 Brazil 63.5 Brazil 71.4
Chile 74.9 Chile 72.3 Chile 78.3
Colombia 70.4 Colombia 67.3 Colombia 74.3
Ecuador 69.5 Ecuador 67.3 Ecuador 72.5
French Guiana 75.0 French Guiana 71.4 French Guiana 79.3
Guyana 63.7 Guyana 59.8 Guyana 67.8
Paraguay 69.6 Paraguay 67.5 Paraguay 72.0
Peru 68.0 Peru 65.9 Peru 70.9
Suriname 70.1 Suriname 67.5 Suriname 72.7
Uruguay 73.9 Uruguay 70.5 Uruguay 78.0
Venezuela 72.4 Venezuela 70.0 Venezuela 75.7
Northern America 76.7 Northern America 73.8 Northern America 79.6
Canada 78.5 Canada 75.7 Canada 81.3
United States United States United States 
of America 76.5 of America 73.6 of America 79.4
OCEANIA 73.5 OCEANIA 71.0 OCEANIA 76.1
Australia/New Zealand 78.4 Australia/New Zealand 75.6 Australia/New Zealand 81.2
Australia 78.7 Australia 75.9 Australia 81.5
New Zealand 77.2 New Zealand 74.5 New Zealand 79.9
Melanesia 58.7 Melanesia 57.6 Melanesia 60.0
Fiji 68.4 Fiji 66.6 Fiji 70.3
New Caledonia 74.0 New Caledonia 71.5 New Caledonia 76.7
Papua New Guinea 55.6 Papua New Guinea 54.8 Papua New Guinea 56.7
Solomon Islands 67.4 Solomon Islands 66.4 Solomon Islands 68.7
Vanuatu 67.2 Vanuatu 66.0 Vanuatu 69.0
Micronesia 71.8 Micronesia 69.7 Micronesia 74.2
Guam 73.5 Guam 71.4 Guam 76.0
Polynesia 70.3 Polynesia 67.7 Polynesia 73.3
French Polynesia 71.7 French Polynesia 69.4 French Polynesia 74.4
Samoa 68.5 Samoa 65.4 Samoa 72.0
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Population Size
Total Mid-Year Population (in Million)
1950 2000 2050
Uzbekistan 6,314 24,881 40,513
South-eastern Asia 178,073 522,121 800,302
Brunei Darussalam 48 328 565
Cambodia 4,346 13,104 29,883
East Timor 433 737 1,410
Indonesia 79,538 212,092 311,335
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 1,755 5,279 11,438
Malaysia 6,110 22,218 37,850
Myanmar 17,832 47,749 68,546
Philippines 19,996 75,653 128,383
Singapore 1,022 4,018 4,620
Thailand 19,626 62,806 82,491
Viet Nam 27,367 78,137 123,782
Western Asia 50,247 188,277 423,888
Armenia 1,354 3,787 3,150
Azerbaijan 2,896 8,041 8,897
Bahrain 116 640 1,008
Cyprus 494 784 910
Georgia 3,527 5,262 3,219
Iraq 5,158 22,946 53,574
Israel 1,258 6,040 10,065
Jordan 472 4,913 11,709
Kuwait 152 1,914 4,001
Lebanon 1,443 3,496 5,018
Occupied Palestinian Territory 1,005 3,191 11,821
Oman 456 2,538 8,751
Qatar 25 565 831
Saudi Arabia 3,201 20,346 59,683
Syrian Arab Republic 3,495 16,189 36,345
Turkey 20,809 66,668 98,818
United Arab Emirates 70 2,606 3,709
Yemen 4,316 18,349 102,379
EUROPE 548,207 727,304 603,328
Eastern Europe 220,199 304,172 222,740
Belarus 7,745 10,187 8,305
Bulgaria 7,251 7,949 4,531
Czech Republic 8,925 10,272 8,429
Hungary 9,338 9,968 7,486
Poland 24,824 38,605 33,370
Republic of Moldova 2,341 4,295 3,577
Romania 16,311 22,438 18,150
Russian Federation 102,702 145,491 104,258
Slovakia 3,463 5,399 4,674
Ukraine 37,298 49,568 29,959
Northern Europe 78,094 95,076 92,801
Channel Islands 102 144 120
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Total Mid-Year Population (in Million)
1950 2000 2050
Botswana 389 1,541 2,109
Lesotho 734 2,035 2,478
Namibia 511 1,757 3,662
South Africa 13,683 43,309 47,301
Swaziland 264 925 1,391
Western Africa 60,411 224,189 608,125
Benin 2,046 6,272 18,070
Burkina Faso 3,960 11,535 46,304
Cape Verde 146 427 807
Côte d’Ivoire 2,775 16,013 32,185
Gambia 294 1,303 2,605
Ghana 4,900 19,306 40,056
Guinea 2,550 8,154 20,711
Guinea Bissau 505 1,199 3,276
Liberia 824 2,913 14,370
Mali 3,520 11,351 41,724
Mauritania 825 2,665 8,452
Niger 2,500 10,832 51,872
Nigeria 29,790 113,862 278,788
Saint Helena 5 6 10
Senegal 2,500 9,421 22,711
Sierra Leone 1,944 4,405 14,351
Togo 1,329 4,527 11,832
ASIA 1,399,170 3,672,342 5,428,170
Eastern Asia 672,483 1,481,075 1,665,197
China 554,760 1,275,133 1,462,058
China, Hong Kong SAR 1,974 6,860 9,648
China, Macao SAR 190 444 527
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 10,815 22,268 28,038
Japan 83,625 127,096 109,220
Mongolia 761 2,533 4,146
Republic of Korea 20,357 46,740 51,560
South-central Asia 498,367 1,480,868 2,538,781
Afghanistan 8,151 21,765 72,267
Bangladesh 41,783 137,439 265,432
Bhutan 734 2,085 5,569
India 357,561 1,008,937 1,572,055
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 16,913 70,330 121,424
Kazakhstan 6,703 16,172 15,302
Kyrgyzstan 1,740 4,921 7,538
Maldives 82 291 868
Nepal 8,502 23,043 52,415
Pakistan 39,659 141,256 344,170
Sri Lanka 7,483 18,924 23,066
Tajikistan 1,532 6,087 9,763
Turkmenistan 1,211 4,737 8,401
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Total Mid-Year Population (in Million)
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Cayman Islands 6 38 89
Cuba 5,850 11,199 10,764
Dominica 51 71 72
Dominican Republic 2,353 8,373 11,959
Grenada 76 94 105
Guadeloupe 210 428 479
Haiti 3,261 8,142 13,982
Jamaica 1,403 2,576 3,815
Martinique 222 383 413
Montserrat 14 4 11
Netherlands Antilles 112 215 259
Puerto Rico 2,218 3,915 4,835
Saint Kitts and Nevis 44 38 34
Saint Lucia 79 148 189
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 67 113 138
Trinidad and Tobago 636 1,294 1,378
Turks and Caicos Islands 5 17 39
United States Virgin Islands 27 121 167
Central America 36,961 135,129 220,229
Belize 69 226 392
Costa Rica 862 4,024 7,195
El Salvador 1,951 6,278 10,855
Guatemala 2,969 11,385 26,551
Honduras 1,380 6,417 12,845
Mexico 27,737 98,872 146,651
Nicaragua 1,134 5,071 11,477
Panama 860 2,856 4,262
South America 112,995 345,738 535,515
Argentina 17,150 37,032 54,522
Bolivia 2,714 8,329 16,966
Brazil 53,975 170,406 247,244
Chile 6,082 15,211 22,215
Colombia 12,568 42,105 70,862
Ecuador 3,387 12,646 21,190
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 2 2 4
French Guiana 25 165 503
Guyana 423 761 504
Paraguay 1,488 5,496 12,565
Peru 7,632 25,662 42,122
Suriname 215 417 418
Uruguay 2,239 3,337 4,249
Venezuela 5,094 24,170 V42,152
Northern America 171,615 314,113 437,619
Bermuda 37 63 79
Canada 13,737 30,757 40,407
Greenland 23 56 62
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Denmark 4,271 5,320 5,080
Estonia 1,101 1,393 752
Faeroe Islands 32 46 55
Finland 4,009 5,172 4,693
Iceland 143 279 333
Ireland 2,969 3,803 5,366
Isle of Man 56 75 81
Latvia 1,949 2,421 1,744
Lithuania 2,567 3,696 2,989
Norway 3,265 4,469 4,880
Sweden 7,014 8,842 7,777
United Kingdom 50,616 59,415 58,933
Southern Europe 108,997 144,935 116,871
Albania 1,215 3,134 3,905
Andorra 4 86 193
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2,661 3,977 3,458
Croatia 3,850 4,654 4,179
Gibraltar 21 27 21
Greece 7,566 10,610 8,983
Holy See 1 1 1
Italy 47,104 57,530 42,962
Malta 312 390 400
Portugal 8,405 10,016 9,006
San Marino 15 27 30
Slovenia 1,473 1,988 1,527
Spain 28,009 39,910 31,282
TFYR Macedonia 1,230 2,034 1,894
Yugoslavia 7,131 10,552 9,030
Western Europe 140,916 183,121 170,916
Austria 6,935 8,080 6,452
Belgium 8,639 10,249 9,583
France 41,829 59,238 61,832
Germany 68,376 82,017 70,805
Liechtenstein 14 33 39
Luxembourg 296 437 715
Monaco 20 33 38
Netherlands 10,114 15,864 15,845
Switzerland 4,694 7,170 5,607
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 166,995 518,809 805,560
Caribbean 17,039 37,941 49,817
Anguilla 5 11 23
Antigua and Barbuda 46 65 73
Aruba 57 101 242
Bahamas 79 304 449
Barbados 211 267 263
British Virgin Islands 6 24 39
76 Annex – Table: Population Size
Total Mid-Year Population (in Million)
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Saint Pierre et Miquelon 5 7 9
United States of America 157,813 283,230 397,063
OCEANIA 12,620 30,521 47,191
Australia/New Zealand 10,127 22,916 30,941
Australia 8,219 19,138 26,502
New Zealand 1,908 3,778 4,439
Melanesia 2,105 6,482 14,213
Fiji 289 814 916
New Caledonia 65 215 397
Papua New Guinea 1,613 4,809 10,980
Solomon Islands 90 447 1,458
Vanuatu 48 197 462
Micronesia 153 516 1,080
Guam 60 155 307
Kiribati 32 83 138
Marshall Islands 13 51 85
Micronesia (Federated States of) 32 123 269
Nauru 3 12 26
Northern Mariana Islands 7 73 216
Palau 6 19 39
Polynesia 236 606 958
American Samoa 19 68 172
Cook Islands 15 20 27
French Polynesia 61 233 372
Niue 5 2 2
Pitcairn 0 0 0
Samoa 82 159 223
Tokelau 2 1 1
Tonga 41 99 125
Tuvalu 5 10 16
Wallis and Futuna Islands 7 14 19
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CBR CDR Growth Rate (in %)
1995–2000 1995–2000 1995–2000
World 22.5 World 9.0 World 1.35
More developed More developed  More developed  
regions 11.2 regions 10.2 regions 1.35
Less developed  Less developed  Less developed 
regions 25.4 regions 8.8 regions 1.62
Less developed regions Less developed regions Less developed regions 
excluding China 28.8 excluding China 9.4 excluding China 1.88
AFRICA 38.7 AFRICA 14.1 AFRICA 2.41
Sub-Saharan Africa 41.7 Sub-Saharan Africa 15.8 Sub-Saharan Africa 2.55
Eastern Africa 43.0 Eastern Africa 17.5 Eastern Africa 2.67
Burundi 43.1 Burundi 21.3 Burundi 0.89
Comoros 38.9 Comoros 9.5 Comoros 2.95
Djibouti 40.7 Djibouti 18.0 Djibouti 2.96
Eritrea 40.9 Eritrea 14.0 Eritrea 2.75
Ethiopia 44.6 Ethiopia 19.0 Ethiopia 2.55
Kenya 35.4 Kenya 12.1 Kenya 2.32
Madagascar 44.0 Madagascar 14.7 Madagascar 2.94
Malawi 47.2 Malawi 22.2 Malawi 2.42
Mauritius 17.1 Mauritius 6.7 Mauritius 0.83
Mozambique 44.7 Mozambique 22.4 Mozambique 2.31
Réunion 19.9 Réunion 5.7 Réunion 1.67
Rwanda 42.4 Rwanda 21.7 Rwanda 8.48
Somalia 52.3 Somalia 18.5 Somalia 3.56
Uganda 50.4 Uganda 20.3 Uganda 2.95
United Republic United Republic United Republic 
of Tanzania 40.4 of Tanzania 13.3 of Tanzania 2.58
Zambia 43.8 Zambia 20.7 Zambia 2.46
Zimbabwe 37.4 Zimbabwe 18.0 Zimbabwe 1.91
Middle Africa 46.0 Middle Africa 16.2 Middle Africa 2.61
Angola 51.0 Angola 20.2 Angola 2.94
Cameroon 37.6 Cameroon 14.8 Cameroon 2.28
Central African Republic 39.6 Central African Republic 19.1 Central African Republic 2.10
Chad 48.4 Chad 19.6 Chad 3.15
Congo 44.5 Congo 14.7 Congo 2.96
Democratic Republic Democratic Republic Democratic Republic 
of the Congo 47.7 of the Congo 15.0 of the Congo 2.56
Equatorial Guinea 43.2 Equatorial Guinea 16.5 Equatorial Guinea 2.68
Gabon 37.8 Gabon 15.8 Gabon 2.63
Northern Africa 27.6 Northern Africa 7.5 Northern Africa 1.86
Algeria 25.7 Algeria 5.7 Algeria 1.82
Egypt 26.2 Egypt 6.8 Egypt 1.82
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 26.4 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 4.7 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 2.13
Morocco 26.8 Morocco 6.6 Morocco 1.87
Sudan 36.1 Sudan 12.2 Sudan 2.13
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CBR CDR Growth Rate (in %)
1995–2000 1995–2000 1995–2000
Tunisia 18.7 Tunisia 6.7 Tunisia 1.12
Western Sahara 34.3 Western Sahara 9.5 Western Sahara 3.34
Southern Africa 27.8 Southern Africa 11.5 Southern Africa 1.61
Botswana 33.6 Botswana 17.0 Botswana 1.61
Lesotho 35.0 Lesotho 14.6 Lesotho 1.69
Namibia 37.6 Namibia 17.6 Namibia 2.06
South Africa 26.7 South Africa 10.8 South Africa 1.57
Swaziland 35.6 Swaziland 14.0 Swaziland 2.04
Western Africa 42.3 Western Africa 15.1 Western Africa 2.67
Benin 42.8 Benin 13.1 Benin 2.66
Burkina Faso 46.7 Burkina Faso 17.9 Burkina Faso 2.32
Cape Verde 31.8 Cape Verde 6.4 Cape Verde 2.30
Côte d’Ivoire 36.0 Côte d’Ivoire 15.4 Côte d’Ivoire 2.14
Gambia 40.4 Gambia 18.5 Gambia 3.11
Ghana 34.0 Ghana 10.8 Ghana 2.20
Guinea 45.7 Guinea 18.2 Guinea 2.13
Guinea-Bissau 44.8 Guinea-Bissau 20.4 Guinea Bissau 2.14
Liberia 50.1 Liberia 16.6 Liberia 7.07
Mali 49.9 Mali 18.5 Mali 2.68
Mauritania 43.5 Mauritania 15.4 Mauritania 3.16
Niger 55.4 Niger 20.7 Niger 3.46
Nigeria 41.7 Nigeria 14.1 Nigeria 2.74
Senegal 39.5 Senegal 13.0 Senegal 2.54
Sierra Leone 49.5 Sierra Leone 26.4 Sierra Leone 1.53
Togo 40.5 Togo 13.9 Togo 3.27
ASIA 22.3 ASIA 7.9 ASIA 1.41
Eastern Asia 15.6 Eastern Asia 7.0 Eastern Asia 0.84
China 16.2 China 7.0 China 0.90
China, Hong Kong SAR 10.3 China, Hong Kong SAR 5.5 China, Hong Kong SAR 1.99
China, Macao SAR 10.8 China, Macao SAR 4.3 China, Macao SAR 1.30
Democratic People’s Democratic People’s Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea 18.6 Republic of Korea 10.4 Republic of Korea 0.82
Japan 9.8 Japan 7.6 Japan 0.26
Mongolia 24.3 Mongolia 8.1 Mongolia 0.97
Republic of Korea 13.7 Republic of Korea 5.5 Republic of Korea 0.78
South-central Asia 27.9 South-central Asia 9.2 South-central Asia 1.81
Afghanistan 47.6 Afghanistan 22.0 Afghanistan 2.64
Bangladesh 31.4 Bangladesh 9.8 Bangladesh 2.12
Bhutan 36.2 Bhutan 9.8 Bhutan 2.60
India 26.2 India 9.0 India 1.69
Iran Iran Iran 
(Islamic Republic of) 23.5 (Islamic Republic of) 5.3 (Islamic Republic of) 1.69
Kazakhstan 16.9 Kazakhstan 10.0 Kazakhstan –0.54
Kyrgyzstan 23.2 Kyrgyzstan 7.6 Kyrgyzstan 1.51
Maldives 37.0 Maldives 6.9 Maldives 3.02
Nepal 36.3 Nepal 11.2 Nepal 2.40
CBR CDR Growth Rate (in %)
1995–2000 1995–2000 1995–2000
Pakistan 37.9 Pakistan 10.8 Pakistan 2.66
Sri Lanka 17.4 Sri Lanka 6.1 Sri Lanka 0.96
Tajikistan 28.8 Tajikistan 6.7 Tajikistan 1.17
Turkmenistan 28.6 Turkmenistan 7.2 Turkmenistan 2.36
Uzbekistan 24.4 Uzbekistan 6.2 Uzbekistan 1.76
South-eastern Asia 23.8 South-eastern Asia 7.4 South-eastern Asia 1.58
Brunei Darussalam 22.2 Brunei Darussalam 3.0 Brunei Darussalam 2.18
Cambodia 38.1 Cambodia 10.8 Cambodia 2.80
East Timor 29.4 East Timor 14.8 East Timor –2.60
Indonesia 22.5 Indonesia 7.5 Indonesia 1.41
Lao People’s Lao People’s Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic 38.2 Democratic Republic 14.1 Democratic Republic 2.38
Malaysia 25.2 Malaysia 4.8 Malaysia 2.09
Myanmar 26.5 Myanmar 11.8 Myanmar 1.48
Philippines 28.4 Philippines 5.5 Philippines 2.03
Singapore 14.2 Singapore 4.9 Singapore 2.90
Thailand 19.6 Thailand 6.1 Thailand 1.34
Viet Nam 21.5 Viet Nam 7.0 Viet Nam 1.40
Western Asia 28.9 Western Asia 6.7 Western Asia 2.28
Armenia 11.2 Armenia 7.3 Armenia 0.14
Azerbaijan 16.1 Azerbaijan 6.2 Azerbaijan 0.91
Bahrain 19.0 Bahrain 3.5 Bahrain 2.21
Cyprus 13.9 Cyprus 7.4 Cyprus 1.05
Georgia 11.7 Georgia 9.4 Georgia –0.34
Iraq 36.5 Iraq 9.9 Iraq 2.70
Israel 21.4 Israel 6.3 Israel 2.43
Jordan 34.3 Jordan 4.6 Jordan 2.90
Kuwait 15.9 Kuwait 2.2 Kuwait 2.48
Lebanon 20.3 Lebanon 5.4 Lebanon 1.97
Occupied Palestinian Occupied Palestinian Occupied Palestinian
Territory 41.8 Territory 5.0 Territory 3.83
Oman 35.3 Oman 4.3 Oman 3.29
Qatar 20.0 Qatar 3.9 Qatar 1.99
Saudi Arabia 34.9 Saudi Arabia 4.4 Saudi Arabia 3.49
Syrian Arab Republic 30.3 Syrian Arab Republic 4.3 Syrian Arab Republic 2.59
Turkey 23.5 Turkey 6.5 Turkey 1.62
United Arab Emirates 16.0 United Arab Emirates 3.6 United Arab Emirates 2.05
Yemen 51.4 Yemen 9.9 Yemen 4.17
EUROPE 10.1 EUROPE 11.5 EUROPE –0.04
Eastern Europe 9.2 Eastern Europe 13.4 Eastern Europe –0.38
Belarus 9.2 Belarus 13.4 Belarus –0.28
Bulgaria 8.0 Bulgaria 14.3 Bulgaria –1.12
Czech Republic 8.8 Czech Republic 10.9 Czech Republic –0.11
Hungary 9.8 Hungary 14.0 Hungary –0.49
Poland 10.5 Poland 9.9 Poland 0.01
Republic of Moldova 12.3 Republic of Moldova 11.8 Republic of Moldova –0.20
CBR CDR Growth Rate (in %)
1995–2000 1995–2000 1995–2000
Martinique 14.8 Martinique 6.2 Martinique 0.59
Netherlands Antilles 16.1 Netherlands Antilles 6.2 Netherlands Antilles 0.99
Puerto Rico 16.1 Puerto Rico 7.7 Puerto Rico 1.03
Saint Lucia 24.0 Saint Lucia 5.7 Saint Lucia 1.14
Trinidad and Tobago 14.0 Trinidad and Tobago 5.9 Trinidad and Tobago 0.50
Central America 26.5 Central America 5.4 Central America 1.85
Belize 28.5 Belize 4.5 Belize 2.17
Costa Rica 23.3 Costa Rica 3.8 Costa Rica 2.48
El Salvador 27.7 El Salvador 6.1 El Salvador 2.04
Guatemala 36.6 Guatemala 7.4 Guatemala 2.64
Honduras 33.5 Honduras 6.6 Honduras 2.64
Mexico 24.6 Mexico 5.1 Mexico 1.63
Nicaragua 35.3 Nicaragua 5.6 Nicaragua 2.72
Panama 22.5 Panama 5.1 Panama 1.64
South America 22.1 South America 6.7 South America 1.51
Argentina 19.9 Argentina 7.9 Argentina 1.26
Bolivia 33.2 Bolivia 9.1 Bolivia 2.33
Brazil 20.3 Brazil 7.1 Brazil 1.33
Chile 19.9 Chile 5.6 Chile 1.36
Colombia 24.5 Colombia 5.8 Colombia 1.77
Ecuador 25.6 Ecuador 6.0 Ecuador 1.97
French Guyana 30.6 French Guyana 4.4 French Guyana 3.50
Guyana 23.7 Guyana 8.4 Guyana 0.47
Paraguay 31.3 Paraguay 5.4 Paraguay 2.59
Peru 24.9 Peru 6.4 Peru 1.73
Suriname 20.2 Suriname 6.0 Suriname 0.39
Uruguay 17.6 Uruguay 9.4 Uruguay 0.73
Venezuela 24.9 Venezuela 4.7 Venezuela 2.02
Northern America 14.2 Northern America 8.4 Northern America 1.04
Canada 11.9 Canada 7.3 Canada 0.93
United States United States United States
of America 14.5 of America 8.5 of America 1.05
OCEANIA 18.2 OCEANIA 7.5 OCEANIA 1.37
Australia/New Zealand 13.7 Australia/New Zealand 7.2 Australia/New Zealand 1.11
Australia 13.4 Australia 7.1 Australia 1.15
New Zealand 14.9 New Zealand 7.6 New Zealand 0.94
Melanesia 32.9 Melanesia 9.3 Melanesia 2.26
Fiji 25.9 Fiji 5.6 Fiji 1.16
New Caledonia 21.4 New Caledonia 4.9 New Caledonia 2.18
Papua New Guinea 34.0 Papua New Guinea 10.6 Papua New Guinea 2.34
Solomon Islands 39.6 Solomon Islands 5.3 Solomon Islands 3.44
Vanuatu 33.7 Vanuatu 6.1 Vanuatu 2.67
Micronesia 30.9 Micronesia 5.4 Micronesia 2.16
Guam 28.4 Guam 4.7 Guam 1.42
Polynesia 24.6 Polynesia 5.3 Polynesia 1.11
French Polynesia 21.5 French Polynesia 4.9 French Polynesia 1.67
Samoa 29.0 Samoa 6.0 Samoa 0.02
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Romania 10.3 Romania 12.0 Romania –0.22
Russian Federation 8.8 Russian Federation 14.3 Russian Federation –0.36
Slovakia 10.8 Slovakia 9.9 Slovakia 0.13
Ukraine 8.9 Ukraine 14.7 Ukraine –0.78
Northern Europe 11.7 Northern Europe 10.8 Northern Europe 0.23
Channel Islands 12.0 Channel Islands 11.0 Channel Islands 0.10
Denmark 12.4 Denmark 11.6 Denmark 0.35
Estonia 8.7 Estonia 13.3 Estonia –1.26
Finland 11.3 Finland 9.6 Finland 0.25
Iceland 15.4 Iceland 6.9 Iceland 0.87
Ireland 14.2 Ireland 8.6 Ireland 1.05
Latvia 7.7 Latvia 13.4 Latvia –0.77
Lithuania 10.2 Lithuania 11.2 Lithuania –0.10
Norway 13.1 Norway 10.1 Norway 0.50
Sweden 10.0 Sweden 10.6 Sweden 0.03
United Kingdom 12.0 United Kingdom 10.8 United Kingdom 0.27
Southern Europe 10.0 Southern Europe 9.8 Southern Europe 0.18
Albania 21.2 Albania 5.5 Albania –0.32
Bosnia and Herzegovina 10.5 Bosnia and Herzegovina 7.4 Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.02
Croatia 11.7 Croatia 10.9 Croatia 0.09
Greece 9.5 Greece 9.8 Greece 0.30
Italy 9.1 Italy 10.4 Italy 0.08
Malta 12.6 Malta 7.7 Malta 0.63
Portugal 11.3 Portugal 10.6 Portugal 0.20
Slovenia 9.1 Slovenia 9.9 Slovenia –0.02
Spain 9.2 Spain 9.2 Spain 0.09
TFYR Macedonia 14.7 TFYR Macedonia 8.2 TFYR Macedonia 0.71
Yugoslavia 12.4 Yugoslavia 10.4 Yugoslavia 0.01
Western Europe 10.7 Western Europe 10.0 Western Europe 0.23
Austria 10.1 Austria 9.9 Austria 0.08
Belgium 10.8 Belgium 9.9 Belgium 0.22
France 12.4 France 9.4 France 0.37
Germany 9.3 Germany 10.7 Germany 0.09
Luxembourg 12.8 Luxembourg 9.4 Luxembourg 1.28
Netherlands 11.9 Netherlands 8.8 Netherlands 0.52
Switzerland 10.3 Switzerland 9.4 Switzerland 0.15
LATIN AMERICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND 
THE CARIBBEAN 23.1 THE CARIBBEAN 6.5 THE CARIBBEAN 1.56
Caribbean 20.8 Caribbean 8.2 Caribbean 1.07
Bahamas 21.1 Bahamas 6.8 Bahamas 1.44
Barbados 12.9 Barbados 8.3 Barbados 0.37
Cuba 13.1 Cuba 7.1 Cuba 0.42
Dominican Republic 24.6 Dominican Republic 6.3 Dominican Republic 1.68
Guadeloupe 17.2 Guadeloupe 6.0 Guadeloupe 0.90
Haiti 31.9 Haiti 13.4 Haiti 1.59
Jamaica 21.6 Jamaica 5.9 Jamaica 0.83
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Sri Lanka 2.1 22.9
Tajikistan 3.7 56.6
Turkmenistan 3.6 54.8
Uzbekistan 2.9 41.0
South-eastern Asia 2.8 47.5
Brunei Darussalam 2.8 9.6
Cambodia 5.3 83.4
East Timor 4.4 135.0
Indonesia 2.6 48.4
Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic 5.3 96.6
Malaysia 3.3 11.6
Myanmar 3.3 92.2
Philippines 3.6 34.4
Singapore 1.6 4.9
Thailand 2.1 25.4
Viet Nam 2.5 40.1
Western Asia 3.9 48.9
Armenia 1.4 16.9
Azerbaijan 1.9 32.5
Bahrain 2.6 16.4
Cyprus 2.0 8.1
Georgia 1.6 19.4
Iraq 5.3 91.7
Israel 2.9 6.3
Jordan 4.7 26.6
Kuwait 2.9 12.3
Lebanon 2.3 20.0
Occupied Palestinian Territory 6.0 24.0
Oman 5.9 26.6
Qatar 3.7 13.6
Saudi Arabia 6.2 25.0
Syrian Arab Republic 4.0 26.9
Turkey 2.7 45.7
United Arab Emirates 3.2 12.0
Yemen 7.6 73.8
EUROPE 1.4 9.8
Eastern Europe 1.3 15.1
Belarus 1.3 12.5
Bulgaria 1.1 15.2
Czech Republic 1.2 5.8
Hungary 1.4 9.6
Poland 1.5 10.0
Republic of Moldova 1.6 20.5
Romania 1.3 22.1
Russian Federation 1.2 16.7
TFR IMR
1995–2000 1995–2000
Slovakia 1.4 8.6
Ukraine 1.3 15.3
Northern Europe 1.7 6.0
Channel Islands 1.5 5.8
Denmark 1.7 5.9
Estonia 1.2 11.1
Finland 1.7 4.4
Iceland 2.0 4.7
Ireland 1.9 6.6
Latvia 1.1 15.6
Lithuania 1.4 10.7
Norway 1.8 4.8
Sweden 1.5 3.5
United Kingdom 1.7 5.9
Southern Europe 1.3 8.4
Albania 2.6 28.3
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.4 15.0
Croatia 1.7 10.1
Greece 1.3 6.6
Italy 1.2 5.6
Malta 1.9 7.7
Portugal 1.5 6.6
Slovenia 1.2 6.1
Spain 1.2 5.7
TFYR Macedonia 1.9 18.2
Yugoslavia 1.8 14.8
Western Europe 1.5 5.2
Austria 1.4 5.4
Belgium 1.5 4.4
France 1.7 5.5
Germany 1.3 5.0
Luxembourg 1.7 6.6
Netherlands 1.5 4.6
Switzerland 1.5 5.1
LATIN AMERICA 
AND CARIBBEAN 2.7 35.6
Caribbean 2.5 37.9
Bahamas 2.4 18.7
Barbados 1.5 12.4
Cuba 1.6 7.5
Dominican Republic 2.9 40.6
Guadeloupe 2.1 8.3
Haiti 4.4 68.3
Jamaica 2.5 21.9
Martinique 1.8 7.0
Netherlands Antilles 2.1 14.2
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World 2.8 59.6
More developed regions 1.6 8.3
Less developed regions 3.1 65.3
Less developed regions
excluding China 3.6 70.3
AFRICA 5.3 91.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.8 97.0
Eastern Africa 6.1 103.1
Burundi 6.8 120.0
Comoros 5.4 76.3
Djibouti 6.1 116.6
Eritrea 5.7 89.3
Ethiopia 6.8 114.8
Kenya 4.6 64.7
Madagascar 6.1 100.2
Malawi 6.8 139.8
Mauritius 2.0 18.5
Mozambique 6.3 136.7
Réunion 2.3 9.0
Rwanda 6.2 121.9
Somalia 7.3 122.3
Uganda 7.1 106.5
United Republic of Tanzania 5.5 81.3
Zambia 6.1 93.6
Zimbabwe 5.0 65.0
Middle Africa 6.4 98.2
Angola 7.2 126.2
Cameroon 5.1 87.3
Central African Republic 5.3 101.2
Chad 6.7 122.5
Congo 6.3 72.1
Democratic Republic 
of the Congo 6.7 90.6
Equatorial Guinea 5.9 107.7
Gabon 5.4 87.7
Northern Africa 3.6 57.7
Algeria 3.3 50.0
Egypt 3.4 50.8
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 3.8 27.8
Morocco 3.4 52.2
Sudan 4.9 85.9
Tunisia 2.3 30.3
Western Sahara 4.4 64.5
TFR IMR
1995–2000 1995–2000
Southern Africa 3.3 63.0
Botswana 4.4 73.9
Lesotho 4.8 108.1
Namibia 5.3 78.5
South Africa 3.1 58.2
Swaziland 4.8 86.9
Western Africa 5.9 96.0
Benin 6.1 87.7
Burkina Faso 6.9 99.1
Cape Verde 3.6 55.6
Côte d’Ivoire 5.1 89.0
Gambia 5.2 125.3
Ghana 4.6 68.6
Guinea 6.3 124.2
Guinea-Bissau 6.0 130.8
Liberia 6.8 111.4
Mali 7.0 130.3
Mauritania 6.0 105.6
Niger 8.0 136.1
Nigeria 5.9 88.1
Senegal 5.6 62.4
Sierra Leone 6.5 165.4
Togo 5.8 83.1
ASIA 2.7 59.3
Eastern Asia 1.8 38.5
China 1.8 41.4
China, Hong Kong SAR 1.2 4.2
China, Macao SAR 1.2 8.9
Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea 2.1 45.1
Japan 1.4 3.5
Mongolia 2.7 65.8
Republic of Korea 1.5 7.9
South-central Asia 3.6 76.1
Afghanistan 6.9 164.7
Bangladesh 3.8 78.8
Bhutan 5.5 62.9
India 3.3 72.5
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 3.2 44.0
Kazakhstan 2.1 44.8
Kyrgyzstan 2.9 43.2
Maldives 5.8 46.4
Nepal 4.8 82.6
Pakistan 5.5 95.3
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Puerto Rico 2.0 11.0
Saint Lucia 2.7 14.3
Trinidad and Tobago 1.7 14.3
Central America 3.0 32.9
Belize 3.4 32.5
Costa Rica 2.8 12.1
El Salvador 3.2 32.0
Guatemala 4.9 46.0
Honduras 4.3 37.1
Mexico 2.8 31.0
Nicaragua 4.3 39.5
Panama 2.6 21.4
South America 2.6 36.7
Argentina 2.6 21.8
Bolivia 4.4 65.6
Brazil 2.3 42.1
Chile 2.4 12.8
Colombia 2.8 30.0
Ecuador 3.1 45.6
French Guiana 4.1 31.9
Guyana 2.5 56.2
Paraguay 4.2 39.2
TFR IMR
1995–2000 1995–2000
Peru 3.0 45.0
Suriname 2.2 29.1
Uruguay 2.4 17.5
Venezuela 3.0 20.9
Northern America 2.0 7.4
Canada 1.6 5.5
United States of America 2.0 7.6
OCEANIA 2.4 26.1
Australia/New Zealand 1.8 5.6
Australia 1.8 5.4
New Zealand 2.0 6.6
Melanesia 4.4 57.9
Fiji 3.2 19.6
New Caledonia 2.6 7.2
Papua New Guinea 4.6 69.0
Solomon Islands 5.6 24.0
Vanuatu 4.6 32.5
Micronesia 4.3 21.5
Guam 4.0 11.0
Polynesia 3.2 19.5
French Polynesia 2.6 9.7
Samoa 4.5 29.8
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